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NOTES
Indigent Access to Civil Courts: The Tiger Is at the
Gates*
Let a man have his hat knocked over his eyes, and the law will zealously
espouse his cause-will mulct his assailantin a fine and costs, and will
do this without charge. But if[the offence is noncriminal],he is politely
referred to a solicitor, with the information that the offence committed
against him is actionable:which means, that if rich he may play double
or quits with Fate;and that if poor he must go without even this chance
of compensation.
H. SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS 109
(rev. ed. 1893).
The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.

Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75
(1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
I.

INTRODUCTION

The accusation that justice in America has become a luxury has
been heard with increasing frequency in recent years. An often criticized
aspect of this perceived discrimination is that the poor are systemati-

cally deprived of effective access, and frequently of any access at all, to
the judicial process by the varied and burdensome expenses of civil
litigation.' Although these financial barriers have been subjected to in* This Note was awarded the Edmund Morgan Prize, given for the best student writing
submitted to the Vanderbilt Law Review during the 1971-72 academic year.
I. See, e.g., Goodpaster, The Integration of Equal Protection, Due ProcessStandards, and
the Indigent's Right of FreeAccess to the Courts, 56 IOWA L. REV. 223 (1970); Silverstein, Waiver

of Court Costs and Appointment of Counsel for Poor Persons in Civil Cases, 2 VAL. U.L. REV.
21 (1967). Willging, FinancialBarriers and the Access of Indigents to the Courts, 57 GEO. L.J.
253 (1968); Note, Litigation Costs: The Hidden Barrierto the Indigent, 56 GEo. L.J. 516 (1968).
Litigation expenses are only one of several related barriers preventing the poor from the effective
utilization of potential legal remedies. See generally P. WALD, LAW AND POVERTY: 1965, at 42-46
(1965); Barvick, LegalServices and the Rural Poor, 15 U. KAN. L. REV. 537, 539-41 (1967); Carlin
& Howard, LegalRepresentationand Class Justice, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 381,423-29 (1965). These

additional barriers, which include lack of both public and professional education about, and willingness to utilize, existing legal opportunities, present a significant obstacle in themselves, an
obstacle greatly magnified when coupled with existing financial barriers. See note 19 infra.
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creasingly successful attacks in the courts, the extent to which they have
been lowered remains unclear. Nevertheless, an examination of the steps
already taken to alleviate the problem of the indigent civil litigant raises
hopes for the eventual establishment of a financially unrestricted right
of access to the civil courts.
Three distinct means of removing the financial barriers to the judicial process have been developed to aid indigent civil litigants: in forma
pauperis statutes;2 a common-law judicial power to allow in forma pauperis proceedings in the absence of statute; and a constitutional right of
access to the courts.3 An evaluation of the comparative utility, both
present and potential, of each of these three approaches requires that
the financial obstacles facing the indigent civil litigant be initially defined and described. Although the myriad differences in court structure
and procedural requirements of the many jurisdictions within this country make an accurate and comprehensive catalogue of the financial
burdens of civil litigation virtually impossible, litigation costs may fairly
be divided into four general classes: fees; costs; bonds; and expenses.'
Fees. This class encompasses the various out-of-pocket payments
statutorily exacted for the performance of some act that serves as a
condition precedent to the institution or continuation of litigation. Included within this class are payments into a court fund for the services
The financial barrier to civil court access is not limited in effect to the poor; for a penetrating
discussion of some of the financial burdens imposed on civil litigants above the poverty level see
B. CHRISTENSEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS: SOME PROBLEMS OF AVAILABIL-

ITY OF LEGAL SERVICES (1970), reviewed,

Cohen, 24

VAND.

L.

REV.

433 (1971); Tollett, 24 VAND.

L. REV. 447 (1971). There has, indeed, been some judicial recognition of the interrelationship of
the latter problem with that of the indigent. Hotel Martha Washington Management Co. v.
Swinick, 66 Misc. 2d 833, 835-37, 322 N.Y.S.2d 139, 142-43 (App. T. 1971), contains a brief but
intriguing debate on the propriety of judicial concern with this subject.
2. "In forma pauperis" designates a proceeding "in the manner of a pauper" in which the
litigant is allowed to pursue his claim or defense without payment of fees or liability for costs.
3. These have been the only tools employed to attack directly the financial barriers to civil
court access. The many other programs designed to improve the position of the poor litigant,
including such efforts as the establishment of small claims courts, specialized administrative agencies, and legal aid societies, which have had only an indirect and haphazard effect on financial
obstacles, are beyond the scope of this Note.
4. Because of their unending variety, and the case-by-case treatment afforded them by the
Supreme Court in the criminal costs cases, see note 46 infra, litigation expenses are uniquely
susceptible to "intellectual balkanization." Solomon, "This New Fetishfor Indigency": Justice and
Poverty in an Affluent Society, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 248, 252 (1966). The 4 classifications chosen
in the text are, except for the creation of a fourth class for security bonds, largely a restatement
of those propounded in one of the earliest attempts to bring order out of the cost chaos. Dayton,
Costs, Fees, and Expenses in Litigation, 167 ANNALS 32 (1933). These 4 classifications emphasize
the interests in the existence of each of these financial burdens against which the indigent litigant's
access interest must compete. Different conclusions by the classifier about the legal problems
presented by financial barriers will result in different classification systems. See, e.g., Willging,
supra note 1,at 271-81; Note, supra note 1,at 517.
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of court officials, as in the case of filing fees, or private persons, as in
jury fees, and payments directly to private individuals for the performance of such court-ordered functions as service of process by publication. In a judicial structure dominated by concepts of personal sovereignty, the fee system was both logically and jurisprudentially sound;
fees constituted the only source of compensation for those who performed the necessary functions of the judicial process in their delegated
exercise of the royal prerogative. Requiring the payment of fees as a
condition of access to the courts, however, is open to serious question
in a popular sovereignty committed to the principle of equal justice for
all. With few exceptions, fees no longer represent direct compensation
for the performance of official functions, but rather constitute a frequently unsuccessful attempt to fund the judicial process at the expense
of those who employ it., Allowing a pricing mechanism to limit the
availability of even those services for which fees must be paid directly
to private parties may be challenged as an anomalous abdication of the
state's responsibility to provide an equally accessible means of conflict
resolution to all its citizens. Free market concepts appear quite inapplicable to the services provided by legal notice newspapers, "private" stenographers, and "private" marshals, for these are in effect industries
subsidized by the court system, for whose pricing policies the state may
be viewed as directly answerable. Such considerations have apparently
discouraged justifications of the modern fee system as an economically
sound charge by the state for providing judicial services to its citizens;
required fee payments most often have been justified as a means of
allocating the state's scarce judicial resources among the too numerous
claims of its citizens.
Costs. Included within this class are the litigation expenses of an
opponent that will be taxed against the unsuccessful litigant at the conclusion of his suit. Costs statutes embody a principle of compensation
for expenses incurred in protecting a just legal claim. Nevertheless, an
early restrictive judicial attitude toward awarding costs, a collection of
arbitrary statutes fixing unrealistically low schedules of allowable costs,
and a discouraging frequency of judgment-proof opponents have combined to make the taxation of costs a compensatory remedy so generally
inadequate that there is frequently no attempt at collection.' As a result,
5. Dayton, supra note 4, at 40-41. Although the statistics are clearly long out of date, the
inadequacy of a fee system to provide continued financial support for judicial operations remains
a general pattern. See, e.g., 1970 PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE

STATES

6.

201-02.
Dayton, supra note 4, at 35-40.

OFFICE OF THE UNITED
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costs usually have little in terrorem effect on the indigent litigant.7
Bonds. Security bonds may be divided into two subclasses. The first
group includes deposits into court to guarantee the eventual payment
of costs in the event of an adverse judgment. These requirements, which
were instituted because of the high rate of default on costs judgments,
are a theoretically sound extension of the compensatory rationale underlying the taxation of costs. Nevertheless, the harsh impact of cost bond
requirements on an indigent who has a meritorious legal claim but lacks
sufficient funds or credit to have his claim adjudicated seems unjustifiable in light of the generally insubstantial compensation provided by
costs awards. This consideration may explain the greater frequency of
cost bond requirements in appellate courts, because there is special
logical force to the assumption that a successful trial litigant has a just
legal claim that merits extra protection against litigational harassment.
The second class of security bonds comprises those required to
regain or maintain possession of contested property pending trial of
certain narrowly defined possessory actions, primarily eviction or replevin proceedings. Because the subject matter of the actions in which
these bonds are required is usually limited to the right of possession,
failure to post bond will result in a de facto adjudication of the possessory dispute; the practical effect of a possessory bond requirement is
thus that of an absolute condition precedent to a judicial resolution of
the underlying controversy.' Unlike cost bonds the amount of these
bonds is fixed neither by statute nor the anxieties of one's opponent;
rather, the amount is determined by the value of the subject matter of
the litigation. Although possessory bonds are obviously designed to
protect the opponent's interest in what may be adjudged his property,
this provides merely a partial explanation for the prevalence of such
statutory requirements; of greater significance is the state's interest in
employing these security bonds as a substitute for the peaceendangering practice of physically repossessing the contested property.
Because the actions in which possessory bonds are required involve a
high frequency of indigent litigation, this bond cost is a far more significant obstacle to civil court access than the restricted statutory scope of
the requirements might indicate.
Expenses. This classification consists of those out-of-pocket expenditures necessary to the successful conduct of a civil suit but not
7. The English practice has been to require, when merited, the payment of truly compensatory "substantial" costs. The probability that an opponent will be required to pay for the entire
litigation has apparently encouraged meritorious indigent litigation. See generall) Goodhart,
Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849 (1929).
8. Cf Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 84 n.14 (1972).
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required by judicial or statutory order.' The largest and most common
expenditures in this class are fees for attorneys' services, which may be

a practical necessity, but, at least at the trial level, are usually not
affirmatively required by the state. Other common expenses arise from
the preparation of evidence, pretrial discovery procedures, and reimbursement of witnesses.
II.

IN FORMA PAUPERIS STATUTES

In forma pauperis statutes, enacted by roughly half the states and
the federal government, 0 are the most widely recognized of the three
means by which the indigent civil litigant may successfully negotiate the

financial barriers to judicial access. There are two basic types of in
forma pauperis statutes: security bond waivers and fee waivers. The first

exempts the litigant from liability for costs, thereby allowing him to
present his case without depositing otherwise required bonds;" a very
few states have extended relief from security requirements to allow
waiver of eviction or replevin bonds.' 2 The second basic statutory type
dispenses with otherwise required fee payments; such statutes rarely

reach fees other than those paid into a court fund, and none contains a
mechanism for easing the burden of expenses beyond providing for
assignment of counsel.' 3 These two types of in forma pauperis statutes

may reflect differing legislative judgments concerning the state's duty
to litigants. The security statutes prevent an opponent from denying the
indigent an opportunity to be heard, but do not allow the indigent the
use of the judiciary without compensation for its services. Conversely,
states with fee waiver statutes adopt an essentially neutral position neither denying a hearing to the poor litigant nor circumscribing the rights
9. Dayton, supra note 4, at 32, would include within this class such intangible losses as the
destruction of goodwill and the interruption of commercial activities. Although similar intangible
losses arguably may be caused to the indigent, they hardly can be considered subject to legislative
or judicial remedy without a radical departure from the existing understanding of the duty of the
state vis-a-vis the judicial process.
10. Silverstein, supra note I, at 33. Note, supra note 1, at 523, suggests that nearly twothirds of the states allow some form of in forma pauperis proaeeding if court rules are taken into
account.
II. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2001(b) (1964); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§20-2510, 59-2214, 612501 (Supp. 1971); see note 17 infra.
12. One of the few is North Carolina. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-1 12 (1969).
13. Eg., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 453.190 (1969); UTAH CODE ANN. § 21-7-4 (1969). But
see LA. CODE CIV. PRO. ANN. art. 5185(2) (West Supp. 1972) (allowing waiver of compulsory
direct witness fee payments). See also note 17 infra. Most states provide that a successful litigant
who has proceeded in forma pauperis is obligated to repay previously waived fees out of the costs
recovered from the other party. E.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 453.200 (1969); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 21-7-6 (1969).
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of his opponent. Despite the inference of divergent legislative judgments
that may be drawn from these two statutory types, the striking similarity of most present in forma pauperis statutes to the original enactments
of the Tudor kings 4 suggests that their disparate results were largely
unintended by the state legislatures. 5 Since neither type of statute alone

provides effective relief for the poor litigant in a jurisdiction in which
both fees and security bonds are required, unthinking adherence to
historical models seems to be the only explanation for the failure of all

but a very few jurisdictions with in forma pauperis statutes to value the
indigent's access interest above the interests of both his opponent and
the state by enacting combined fee and security waiver legislation. 6
On the whole, existing in forma pauperis statutes provide questionable protection for the indigent litigant: the scope of their application

is frequently limited and varies considerably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction; 17 a sizable and largely unreviewable discretion to permit statu14. A Mean to Help and Speed Poor Persons in Their Suits, II Hen. 7, c.12 (1495) (fee
waiver); An Act That the Plaineiff Being Nonsuited, Shall Yield Damages to the Defendants in
Actions Personal, By the Discretion of the Justices, 23 Hen. 8, c.15 (1531) (exempting pauper
litigants from liability for costs).
15. The suggestion that enacting legislatures were little concerned with the plight of the
indigent litigant is reinforced by the historical pattern of the enactments. Security waiver legislation has usually accompanied the enactment of costs statutes; on these occasions, both the costs
and waiver statutes were patterned on early English counterparts. Fee waiver statutes were generally enacted by legislatures of newly created governmental bodies; these statutes were enacted as
elements of an entire procedural code, usually fashioned with reference to the procedural rules
formerly in force in the jurisdiction.
16. E.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 271.29 (Supp. 1972).
17. See Silverstein, supra note 1, at 33-36; Note, supra note 1, at 523-32. These authorities
are no longer wholly reliable; although significant change has been infrequent, amendment, reorganization, enactment, and repeal of various state provisions has been common in recent years.
Nevertheless, the general conclusions drawn by these commentators remain valid.
The wide variations in the scope of existing provisions for in forma pauperis relief may best
be seen by comparing some of the specific statutes. The Arkansas statute is limited to plaintiffs
who are not worth $10 over and above necessary wearing apparel, and may not be invoked in the
chancery courts of certain counties nor in any slander, libel, or malicious prosecution suit. If these
highly restrictive conditions are met, the indigent may proceed "without paying any fees to the
officers of the court" and may have assigned counsel. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-401 to -405 (1962).
Colorado allows any poor party to proceed in any court "without the payment of costs, and
thereupon such person shall have all the necessary writs, process and proceedings . . . without
charge." COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1-3 (Supp. 1965). The Florida statute is limited to "insolvent and poverty stricken" plaintiffs seeking to sue in the county in which they reside; a plaintiff
who meets the extensive certification requirements is then allowed to proceed without "prepayment
of costs to any judge, clerk, sheriff or constable in the county." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 57.081 (1969).
Hawaii has, in effect, two in forma pauperis statutes. A plaintiff in district court who claims less
than $25 in an action where no property is seized under an attachment is permitted, upon an oath
of inability to pay, to proceed without prepayment of any costs except witness fees; the court does,
however, possess discretion to tax these costs against the plaintiff if he loses at trial upon the merits.
HAWAII REV. LAWS § 633-11 to -15 (1968). A much broader statute gives any magistrate or judge
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tory in forma pauperis proceedings rests in the trial judge;'8 and the
infrequency with which these statutory rights are actually invoked has
the power to waive prepayment of, reduce, or remit costs where they "appear onerous." HAWAII
REV. LAWS § 607-3 (1968). The Illinois statute is quite similar to Colorado's, but it additionally
allows "all appearances" without charge and provides for assigned counsel. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
33, §§ 5-6 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972). Kansas allows only the waiver of cost bonds for indigent
plaintiffs in magistrate (applicable only to residents), probate, or district court; the only fee which
may be waived entirely is the supreme court docket fee. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2001(b) (1964);
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-2510, 59-2214, 60-2701, Rule 2, 61-2501 (Supp. 1971). Kentucky's statute
is limited to residents, to whom it provides assigned counsel and "all needful services and process"
from all officers of the court. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 453.190 (1969). Louisiana has one of the
most extensive of the state statutes. Its chief limitations are to citizens or aliens domiciled in the
state for more than 3 years and to all actions except those "for a divorce or for a separation from
bed and board." LA. CODE CIv. PRO. ANN. art. 5181 (West Supp. 1972). But see note 113 infra.
The statute explicitly allows waiver of prepayment of and deposit of security for all court officer,
witness, jury, and appellate writ fees, although it provides that "[n]o public officer is required to
make any cash outlay to perform any duty imposed on him" by the statute. LA. CODE CIV. PRO.
ANN. art. 5185 (West Supp. 1972). The most intriguing aspect of the statute is its statement of
policy: "The privilege granted by this Chapter shall be restricted to litigants who are clearly entitled
to it . . . so that the fomentation of litigation by an indiscriminate resort thereto may be discouraged, without depriving a litigant of its benefits if he is entitled thereto." LA. CODE Civ. PRO. ANN.
art. 5182 (West 1961). The Mississippi statute applies only to citizen plaintiffs; it allows waiver of
prepayment of fees and deposit of security for costs at the trial level. Miss. CODE ANN. § 1574
(1957). In North Carolina, an indigent plaintiff may proceed at the trial level without payment of
fees to officers of the court, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-24 (1969), and without providing a prosecution
bond, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-110 (Supp. 1971). An indigent defendant to an eviction action may
defend without posting bond, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-112 (1969); any indigent party may appeal
without providing security, but no appellate fees are waived. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-288 (Supp.
1971). The Oklahoma statute waives all fee payments to officers of the court, including appellate
transcript preparation charges and the deposit for notice by publication, at the trial level, including
trials de novo in the courts of general jurisdiction; statutory bonds are unaffected by the statute.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 152, 155.1-157 (Supp. 1971). South Carolina has a unique provision
that authorizes the remission of court costs in circuit or inferior courts in only 2 counties. S.C.
CODE ANN. § 10-1604 (1962). The Tennessee statute waives the required posting of cost bonds for
resident plaintiffs desiring to prosecute actions for other than false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, slanderous words, and absolute divorce. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-1629 (Supp. 1971). West
Virginia's in forma pauperis statute provides a sweeping exemption from the payment of fees and
costs; there is no express provision exempting the indigent litigant from posting bonds, nor from
the payment of costs at the appellate level, but the bond statutes vest wide discretion in the judge.
W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59-1-36, 59-2-1 (1966). See also notes 24-27 infra and accompanying text;
notes 85, 87 infra.
18. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-403 (1962) (court must be "satisfied of the facts alleged
[in the petition to proceed in forma pauperis], and that the applicant has a meritorious cause of
action ..
"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 57.081 (1969) (vesting power to certify insolvency in clerk of
court, reviewable by the court upon refusal); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 33, § 5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972)
(if "satisfied" of petitioner's poverty and inability to pay costs, "the court may, in its discretion,"
allow proceeding in forma pauperis). Appellate challenges to trial court denials as abusive of
discretion are costly and rarely made, and when made are rarely successful. See, e.g., Hollier v.
Broussard, 220 So. 2d 175, 178 (La. Ct. App. 1969) (trial court's discretion should not be disturbed
in the absence of abuse); Standley v. Western Auto Supply Co., 319 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1959) (disposition of motion to proceed in forma pauperis rests within the sound discretion
of the trial court). But see Crawford v. Government Employees' Ins. Co., 219 So. 2d 241 (La. Ct.
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effectively allowed them to atrophy. 9 The major reason for the present
general inadequacy of the statutory in forma pauperis remedy, however,

is that the basic pattern about which this relief is structured has hardly
altered since the enactment of the first in forma pauperis statute in
2
1495.20 Enactments and amendments have generally been sporadic, '
App. 1969) (reversing trial court denial to student subsisting largely on loans). A few courts have
attempted to establish guidelines for the exercise of discretion at the trial level. See, e.g., Hollier
v. Broussard, 220 So. 2d 175, 177 (La. Ct. App. 1969) ("the general approach ... is to balance
against income the needs of living and of paying other debts and expenses, and then to determine
whether the residual income (or savings or surplus property) is adequate to pay the expected costs
of litigation or to furnish a bond therefor."); cf Silverstein, supra note 1, at 34,44 n.1 16 (indicating
that Kentucky judges habitually follow the old English rule allowing in forma pauperis proceedings
only to those litigants who have less than £5 exempt from execution).
Another source of the ultimate judicial dominance over the allowance of in forma pauperis
relief is found in the many decisions attempting to fill perceived lacunae in the statutory provisions.
See Annot., 33 A.L.R. 731 (1924) (discussing the judicially created doctrine that a litigant represented by an attorney on a contingent fee basis was disqualified from in forma pauperis relief):
Annot., 156 A.L.R. 956 (1945) (discussing decisions denying in forma pauperis treatment to
litigants who had not paid the costs of an earlier suit); Annot., 11 A.L.R.2d 607 (1950) (discussing
denials of in formal pauperis applications because of the nonindigence of an attorney or other
nonparty); Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 292 (1964) (discussing judicial determinations of the amenability
to waiver of specific costs and fees). See also Duniway, The Poor Man in the Federal Courts, 18
STAN. L. REV. 1270, 1277-84 (1966); Silverstein, supra note 1, at 45-49.
19. Silverstein, supra note 1, at 42-45,49-50, contains a summary of the results of a questionnaire survey conducted by the American Bar Foundation. State court judges demonstrated a
widespread lack of knowledge about in forma pauperis statutes in effect in their jurisdictions; some
of the judges confessed ignorance about the statutes while others denied the existence of such
provisions. Those judges who indicated some familiarity with the statutes also replied that the great
majority of those few cases in which these provisions were invoked were either habeas corpus
proceedings, actions involving indigent prisoners, or suits under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. The ABF also surveyed a number of legal aid offices and received a similarly
discouraging response. The ABF concluded that the results of the surveys "tend to show that, with
few exceptions, available waiver procedures are little known and seldom used." Id. at 44. See also
Schmertz, The Indigent Civil Plaintiff in the District of Columbia: Facts and Commentary, 27
FED. B.J. 235, 238-41, 251-53 (1967). This article contains a statistical analysis of the incidence
and results of in forma pauperis proceedings in the District of Columbia over a 5-year period. In
less than one-half of one percent of the federal district court cases did a litigant press a conventional
civil claim in forma pauperis. Similar minimal utilization of waiver provisions was apparent in the
other courts in the District. Moreover, the inadequacy of the in forma pauperis remedy in and of
itself was indicated by the astonishingly high failure rate of these proceedings; over one-half of these
cases were dismissed before trial or resulted in summary judgment for the nonindigent party, and
only one resulted in a victory for the indigent in a trial on the merits. The results of this investigation reinforce Silverstein's conclusion that present "in forma pauperis procedures are not of much
use to a poor person unless some one else, some one more sophisticated, sets the machinery in
motion for him." Silverstein, supra note I, at 45.
20. A Mean to Help and Speed Poor Persons in Their Suits, II Hen. 7, c. 12 (1495).
21. Nearly 400 years of increasing discontent with its operation passed before the English
fee waiver statute was first revised. Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 HARV. L. REv. 361,
373-79 (1923). In forma pauperis legislation was virtually nonexistent in America throughout the
nineteenth century. Id. at 381-82. There was no federal in forma pauperis statute before 1892, and
its limitations as first enacted were legislatively removed only after extensive, wasteful litigation.
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and the changes that have been made from the early English model for

the most part have been directed at the removal of only the most obvious
original flaws. 2 Contemporary statutes thus continue to present the
fundamental structural inadequacies of the English enactment-the absence of a readily administrable mechanism for limiting in forma
pauperis relief to qualified applicants with meritorious claims and the
lack of adequate provisions to ensure that the qualifying claimant obtains full and effective access to the courts.23 Notable exceptions to this
pattern may, however, be found in two recent state enactments. West

Virginia has adopted a provision shifting the administrative burden of
determining eligibility for statutory relief to a body better suited to such
evaluations by making the waiver of all statutory fees mandatory whenever an in forma pauperis applicant submits a certification of poverty
"by the chief executive officer of a duly chartered legal aid society." 4
Of potentially greater significance, however, is the New Hampshire

statute,2 the most recent of the state enactments. In addition to the
traditional provisions for discretionary waiver of fees for an applying
pauper, the statute provides for mandatory waiver whenever the applicant "is represented by a legal aid society, a federally funded legdl
services project, or counsel assigned in accordance with the rules of the
court."2 This remarkable provision shifts the great bulk of the administrative burden of evaluating in forma pauperis applications from the
courts to organizations functioning under the statute as special-purpose
Duniway, supra note 18, at 1271-77. The comparatively liberal federal statute was not widely
copied by the more parsimonious state legislatures. The Standing Committee on Legal Aid Work
of the American Bar Association drafted a "Poor Litigant's Statute" in 1924, but it failed to
stimulate interest in the state legislatures and was never enacted in any jurisdiction. For the text
of the statute see Standing Committee on Legal Aid Work, Report, 49 A.B.A. REP. 384, 386 (1924)
(first draft); 50 A.B.A. REP. 451, 456 (1925) (second draft). A renewed effort was proposed
without success in 1941. Standing Committee on Legal Aid Work, Report, 66 A.B.A. REP. 252,
253 (1941). Apart from the widespread enactment of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act, which contains a limited in forma pauperis provision (§ 15 of the 1958 Act) there is
no discernible pattern to the state enactments. Even the URESA provision is not uniformly
enacted. See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 273A, §§ 15, 15A (1968) (distinguishing between actions
in which Massachusetts is the initiating and responding state; in the latter case the petitioner may
avoid payment of service of process fees if the initiating state has a similar provision and if the
petitioner files an affidavit of good faith, inability to pay, and a lack of assets worth over $100
with certain exclusions).
22. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § I 101 (Practice Commentary) (McKinney 1963) (abolishing the limitation to plaintiffs with assets below $300).
23. Maguire, supra note 21, at 398-404, points out these and other weaknesses and offers
some suggested changes which, despite the passage of nearly half a century, remain remarkably
persuasive. See also Duniway, supra note 18, at 1282-87.
24. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 59-1-36 (1966).

25.

N.H.

26.

Id.

REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 499:18-b (Supp. 1972).
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administrative agencies, for whose existence and continued operation
the state has little or no financial responsibility. New Hampshire may

thus have reduced its total expenditures of time and money, eliminated
duplication of legal aid efforts by the judiciary, and created a more
efficient in forma pauperis procedure, with only a minimal reduction of
the state's ability to control access to its courts. Although the specific
relief afforded by the New Hampshire statute is fairly limited in scope,"

the concept on which the statute rests represents a healthy departure
from previous legislative patterns. Moreover, it is likely that the courts

rarely will grant discretionary applications under this statute without
sending the unrepresented litigant to a qualifying organization, thereby
further assuring that he will be able to make more effective use of the
judicial process.

Because the scope of relief that can be provided by in forma pauperis statutes is limited only by the legislatures' unwillingness to expend

public funds for the benefit of the poor litigant, legislation has clearly
the greatest potential for ameliorating the condition of the indigent
seeking access to the civil courts. Legislative inertia, judicial antago-

nism, 2 and administrative obstructionism,29 however, present formidable obstacles to the realization of this potential.
III.

THE COMMON-LAW REMEDY

Indigent would-be litigants in jurisdictions without in forma pauperis statutes, or with statutes that are inadequate, predictably have
looked to the courts for relief. Until recently, the only theory suggested
to support judicial alleviation of financial burdens was that the received
English common law included an inherent judicial power to dispense
with costs, fees, bonds, and even certain expenses. The few available
historical records that touched on this matter indicate that commonlaw, equity, and ecclesiastical courts often exercised such powers in the
27. The statute permits the waiver of only those "fees provided by law which are payable to
any court, clerk of court, or sheriff." Fees paid directly to private parties, expenses, and bond
requirements are unaffected by the statute. Id.
28. See Earls v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. 3d 109, 111 n.3, 490 P.2d 814, 816 n.3, 98 Cal. Rptr.
302, 304 n.3 (1971) (trial court had automatically refused all in forma pauperis applications for
preceding 5 years); Blood, Injunction Bonds: Equal Protection for the Indigent, I I S. TEXAs L.J.
16, 23 (1969); Duniway, supra note 18, at 1277-80; Silverstein, supra note 1, at 51-53; Stumpf &
Janowitz, Judges and the Poor: Bench Responses to Federally Financed Legal Services, 21 STAN.
L. REv. 1058, 1069-72 (1969).
29. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Mauzy, 181 S.E.2d 329 (W. Va. 1971) (clerk of court refused to
file final judgment in an in forma pauperis proceeding because filing fee not paid; mandamus
issued). Several state statutes provide criminal penalties for failure to perform official acts for an
in forma pauperis litigant. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 21-7-6 (1969).
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absence of statute. 3 This interpretation of historical evidence has,
moreover, been endorsed by the English courts. 3' Nevertheless, a

common-law judicial power to allow proceedings in forma pauperis has
been recognized by few American courts. Several early cases seemed to
announce such a power in rejecting, on behalf of poor litigants, demands
of security for costs. 32 Despite their apparent extensibility to a waiver

of fees, none of these cases has served to establish a firm precedential
foundation for the development of an effective common-law form of

proceeding for the indigent litigant. 33 The majority of courts, 34 moreover, including the United States Supreme Court, 35 expressly denied
the existence of such a power. Only California was able to develop a
truly effective common-law remedy. In the leading case of Martin v.
Superior Court,36 the California Supreme Court explicitly relied on the

English precedents to uphold the power, and duty, of state courts of
record to remit statutory jury and court reporter fees. Following
Martin, the California courts have extended the common-law relief to
30. The best concise summary of the historical evidence may be found in Maguire, supra
note 21. at 363-79.
31. See, e.g., Brunt v. Wardle, 133 Eng. Rep. 1254 (C.P. 1841).
32. M'Clenahan v. Thomas, 6 N.C. 247 (1813) (treating 23 Hen. 8, c. 15 (1531), which
absolved a pauper from liability for costs, as part of the received common law); Eakert v. McCord,
21 Pa. County Ct. 333, 336 (1898) (indicating that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1807 had
reported the English costs waiver statute to be in force in the commonwealth); Spalding v. Bainbridge. 12 R.I. 244 (1879) (relying in part on a provision of the state constitution guaranteeing the
right to obtain justice freely and without purchase); Hickey v. Rhine, 16 Tex. 577 (1856) (asserting
in dictum a "general power, independent of statute," to refuse demands for security).
33. Each of these cases was limited by its factual or legal setting. The M'Clenahan holding
was cast in the limited terms of a construction of the North Carolina costs statute. In Eakert, the
demand for security for costs was an obvious ploy to avoid litigation by the defendant; the court
could, moreover, have accomplished the same result by a liberal construction of Pennsylvania's
existing security statute, as had been done 20 years earlier in Wendell v. Simpson, 7 Weekly Notes
of Cases 31 (Montgomery County C.P. 1879). The holding in Spalding was expressly limited to
cost bonds by the court's reliance on a statute making a dismissal for failure to post bonds
discretionary as inconsistent with and superior to the peremptory terms of the bond requirement.
The Hickey dictum was only the third of 3 suggested grounds for refusal of the bond demand; the
court had already implied a waiver of the bond by the demanding party and had indicated that
the existing Texas in forma pauperis statute could have been construed to provide relief. Hickey's
only subsequent appearance as precedent was to support a finding of waiver by the demanding
party. State v. Gutschke, 149 Tex. 292, 233 S.W.2d 446 (1950). It is probable that the major reason
that these cases failed to support a fully developed common-law remedy was that they represented
a special attitude toward costs. As one Pennsylvania court stated in a further expansion of Eakert
to protect nonresident plaintiffs: "It is a less hardship for a successful defendant to lose his costs
than for a poor plaintiff to be denied justice." Willis v. Willis, 20 Pa. Dist. 720, 721 (Erie County
C.P. 1911).
34. Campbell v. Chicago & N. Ry., 23 Wis. 490 (1868), is typical of the brevity with which
most courts rejected the suggestion of this remedy.
35. Bradford v. Southern Ry., 195 U.S. 243, 251 (1904).
36. 176 Cal. 289, 168 P. 135 (1917).
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the waiver of all statutory fees required to be paid into court funds at
both the trial and appellate levels, 37 and have also exercised their power

to reject demands3 for statutorily guaranteed cost bonds ir both trial and
appellate courts.

1

The generally laudatory reception of the Martin decision by legal
scholars 39 had no apparent impact on other courts. Only with recent
pressure for the declaration of a constitutional right of access to the civil
courts' has the common-law remedy experienced a renaissance. Since
1967, the courts of at least four states have recognized an inherent power
to waive filing fees4 in the face of an indigent party's assertion of equal
protection or due process arguments; significantly, only one court based

its holding on the English precedents. Although this rediscovery of the
common law indubitably will provide some relief for the poor litigant,
its potential significance seems limited. Reliance on "inherent" powers

out of a sense of expediency may well prove as insubstantial a foundation for truly effective relief as the early costs security cases. The determination of appropriate circumstances for the invocation of this power,
moreover, may impose an administrative burden on the courts at least
as great as that of most in forma pauperis statutes.42 More importantly,
37. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Keays, 4 Cal. 3d 649, 484 P.2d 70, 94 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1971).
38. Roberts v. Superior Court, 264 Cal. App. 2d 235, 70 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1968) (appellate
cost bond); Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Superior Court, 255 Cal. App. 2d 575,
63 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1967) (nonresident plaintiffs cost bond); County of Sutter v. Superior Court,
244 Cal. App. 2d 770, 53 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1966) (cost bonds demanded of resident plaintiff refused).
39. See R. SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR 29-30 (3d ed. 1924); Grinnell, Have Massachusetts Courts Inherent Common Law Power To Permit Suits In Forma Pauperis?-A Question of
Construction under Article XI of the Bill of Rights, 4 MASS. L.Q. 323 (1919) (urging adoption of
the Martin rationale by the Massachusetts courts); Maguire, supranote 21, at 384-85 (commenting
that the common-law remedy "is something, but not nearly enough"); 31 HARV. L. REV. 485
(1918).
40. See notes 46-57 infra and accompanying text.
41. Myers v. Archuleta, I CCH Pov. L. REP.
662.953 (Idaho Dist. Ct. 1971) (waiver of
defendant's filing fee); Casper v. Huber, 85 Nev. 474, 456 P.2d 436 (1969) (waiver of appellate
filing fees), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1012 (1970); Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 58 Misc. 2d 1045, 1051, 296
N.Y.S.2d 74, 82 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (recognizing "inherent power" in dictum), rev'd on other grounds,
38 App. Div. 2d 431, 330 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1972); O'Connor v. Matzdorff, 76 Wash. 2d 589, 458
P.2d 154 (1969) (announcing a broad fee waiver power, based on historical evidence), noted in 45
WASH. L. REV. 389 (1970); cf. Coonce v. Coonce, 356 Mass. 690, 255 N.E.2d 330 (1970) (relying
on a statutory grant of all powers of equity and ecclesiastical courts to uphold probate court's fee
waiver power). Contra, Sloatman v. Gibbons, 104 Ariz. 429, 454 P.2d 574 (1969) (no inherent
power to remit fees), vacated on othergrounds, 402 U.S. 939 (1971); State ex rel. Caulk v. Nichols,
267 A.2d 610 (Del. Super. 1970) (no inherent common-law power in justice of the peace to waive
appeal bond), affd, 281 A.2d 24 (Del. 1971), appeal dismissed, 408 U.S. 901 (1972): Ortwein v.
Schwab, 498 P.2d 757, 761-62 (Ore. 1972) (no inherent fee waiver power).
42. See 45 WASH. L. REV. 389, 392-95 (1970) (criticizing the standards of "indigence,"
"good faith," and "probable merit" established in O'Connor v. Matzdorff, 76 Wash. 2d 589, 458
P.2d 154 (1969)).
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no court has announced a willingness to rely on the common-law remedy to order the payment from the public treasury of expenses, or even
of fees required by law to be paid directly to third parties. 3 The
common-law remedy may, however, be significantly more useful to the

indigent than most contemporary in forma pauperis statutes, because,
as it is described by some courts," the inherent power of waiver is not
susceptible to the arbitrary restrictions on applicability45 that frequently
vitiate the statutory remedy.
IV.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDY: BODDIE V. CONNECTICUT

The argument that there exists a constitutionally protected right of
financially unrestricted access to the civil courts had its genesis in a
series of Supreme Court criminal decisions, 6 commencing with Griffin
v. Illinois.7 In Griffin, the Court discerned interdependent due process

and equal protection violations in situations "where the kind of trial a
man gets depends on the amount of money he has." 48 Because of the
special criminal procedure aspects of Griffin and its progeny, however,

any extension to civil litigation49 of their apparent underlying rationale
43. See. e.g;, Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 58 Misc. 2d 1045, 1048-51, 296 N.Y.S.2d 74, 79-82 (Sup.
Ct. 1968) (no inherent power to order payment of "auxiliary expenses" out of public funds), rev'd
on othergrounds, 38 App. Div. 2d 431, 330 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1972); Rucker v. Superior Court, 104
Cal. App. 683, 286 P. 732 (1930) ("no legal mode of requiring payment" to official court reporter
for trial transcript to be used for an appeal); ef.Casper v. Huber, 85 Nev. 474, 456 P.2d 436 (1969)
(impliedly no inherent power to assign counsel), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1012 (1970). But cf.In re
Karren, 280 Minn. 377, 159 N.W.2d 402 (1968) (ordering payment for transcript in juvenile court
appeal without statutory authorization in order to prevent vitiation of statutory in forma pauperis
appeal remedy). See also R. SMITH, supra note 39, at 100-02 (urging the revival of the early
common-law practice of assigning counsel to all meritorious poor litigants).
44. See, e.g.. Martin v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. 289, 296, 168 P. 135, 138 (1917) (arbitrary
limitation of in forma pauperis relief to courts of limited jurisdiction would be reproachful);
O'Connor v. Matzdorff, 76 Wash. 2d 589, 604-06, 458 P.2d 154, 162-63 (1969) (limitation of in
forma pauperis relief to appellate courts and courts of general jurisdiction would be anachronistic).
45. See note 17 supra.
46. E.g.. Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959) (invalidated appellate filing fee requirement as
applied to indigent petitioner); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961) (invalidating filing fees for
habeas corpus petitions on equal protection grounds alone); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963) (requiring assignment of counsel for an appeal as of right); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S.
40 (1967) (a per curian opinion requiring the state to furnish free transcript of preliminary hearing
despite seeming availability of arguably adequate substitute).
47. 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (announcing indigent criminal appellant's right to a free transcript
in the absence of other means of affording adequate and effective appellate review).
48. Id. at 19.
49. Habeas corpus proceedings, to which Griffin was applied in Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S.
708 (1961). are technically treated as civil actions for procedural purposes. The Court, however,
noted in Smith that the issue there presented was not the state's ability to condition civil court
access but rather its right to detain indigent prisoners without a hearing because those prisoners
were unable to pay the requisite fee. Id. at 711-12. The Court expressly narrowed its holding to
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of invalid wealth discrimination seemed problematic" until the Court,
in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,; invalidated a state poll tax
on equal protection grounds. Although the precise theoretical bases for
2 and the criminal cases"' are far from clear,
the holdings in Harper5
exclude other civil actions involving civil rights, and even other habeas corpus proceedings not
brought by indigent convicted prisoners. Id. at 713.
50. Compare Qua, Griffin v. Illinois, 25 U. CI. L. REv. 143, 149-50 (1957) (concluding that
Griffin would not be applicable to civil cases generally) with Recent Development, Poverty and
Equal Access to the Courts: The Constitutionality of Summary Dispossess in Georgia, 20 STAN.
L. REv. 766, 770-72 (1968) (no inherent limitation in Griffin to criminal cases).
51. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
52. The majority opinion, authored by Mr. Justice Douglas, seems at some points to declare
the poll tax invalid under an "old" equal protection test of conceivable rational purpose. "Voter
qualifications have no relation to wealth nor to paying or not paying this or any other tax." Id. at
666. Other statements indicate that the tax was subjected to strict scrutiny and invalidated under
"new" equal protection standards. "In this context-that is, as a condition of obtaining a balI...
Id. at 668. Support
lot-the requirement of fee paying causes an 'invidious' discrimination .
for an understanding of Harper as a "new" equal protection decision can be found in the Court's
emphasis on prior decisions establishing the right to vote as fundamental. Id. at 667 (relying on
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886), and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62
(1964)).
53. The key to the reasoning of the plurality opinion in Griffin is the observation that "our
own constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection both call for procedures in
criminal trials which allow no invidious discriminations between persons and different groups of
persons." 351 U.S. at 17. The plurality found invidious discrimination in the denial to petitioners,
solely because of their indigence, of the appellate review of convictions made available by the state
to the more wealthy. Viewed in the light of the Court's narrow holding in Smith v. Bennett, 365
U.S. 708 (1961), see note 49 supra, the plurality opinion apparently discerned due process violations in the state's continuing deprivation of the convicts' liberty by arbitrarily foreclosing an
established opportunity to be heard. Cf. Hovey v. Elliot, 167 U.S. 409 (1897). Nevertheless, the
main thrust of the plurality opinion seems directed toward the equal protection argument. See
generally Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment,
83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 19-33 (1969). This incisive article subjects the Court's "new" equal protection
decisions to strict scrutiny and concludes that the rhetoric of invalidating invidious wealth discrimination misrepresents the Court's basic approach to the deprivations caused by economic inequality.
The article emphasizes the signal importance of the rights at issue in Harper and Griffin-the rights
to vote and to be free from abuse of the criminal process-in the Court's invalidation of the
required fee payments. "It is uninformative at best, and very likely misleading as well, to defend
such exceptional holdings through formulas of disparagement ('invidious' or 'suspect classification:' 'lines . . . drawn on the basis of wealth;' 'discrimination against the indigent') which apply
nonselectively to the pricing practice and refer not at all to any exceptional attributes in the
excepted commodities." Id. at 28. Herein lies the major hurdle confronting the equal protection
argument for a financially unrestricted right of civil court access; although the Court has held that
the right to fair treatment by the judicial process (once it has obtained the jurisdictional power to
deprive the litigant of his disputed rights) is fundamental, the Court has never recognized a
fundamental right to set the judicial machinery in motion. Even within the judicial process, moreover, equal protection demands for affirmative state equalization of the disparity created by economic disadvantages in the ability to utilize that process effectively find little support in the Court's
past decisions. Despite egalitarian rhetoric, see text accompanying note 48 supra, the Court has
yet to attack on equal protection grounds de facto wealth classificatibns resulting from other than
a state fee payment requirement (Harper) or the establishment by the state of inferior alternative
procedures for the indigent (Griffin et al.). These limitations are unrelated to the "state action"
requirement; the establishment of civil courts with conditions upon access should surely be sufficient state action to justify application of the fourteenth amendment.
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these decisions were seized upon by several commentators as laying the

foundation for a constitutional attack upon financial barriers to civil
court access. " This attack was generally unsuccessful in the state and

lower federal courts,55 although there were a few cases in which an equal
protection argument prevailed. 6 Finally, 7 in 1971, the Supreme Court
partially answered the access question. In Boddie v. Connecticut, 8 the

Court invalidated, as applied to indigent plaintiffs, 9 a state requirement
that filing and service of process fees be paid as a condition precedent

to the maintenance of a divorce action." The Boddie holding is remarkably clear;"' the constitutional theory upon which that holding rests, and

upon which subsequent access litigation must therefore rest at least in
part, is not. The majority opinion, by Mr. Justice Harlan, was founded
entirely on due process considerations. Mr. Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion, relied on the equal protection-due process rationale
underlying Griffin. Mr. Justice Douglas, also concurring, based his conclusions solely on equal protection grounds.12 Because these various
theories could have significantly different effects as applied to subsequent access cases, it is necessary to examine each in some detail.
The majority's analysis was founded upon the basic constitutional

obligation of the state to administer its judicial determinations of legal
rights so as to provide "each individual that process which, in the light
of the values of a free society, can be characterized as due. '6 3 Recogniz54. See, e.g., Goodpaster, supra note I; Note, DiscriminationsAgainst the Poor and the
FourteenthAmendment, 81 HARV. L. REv. 435, 450-52 (1967).
55. E.g., In re Garland, 428 F.2d 1185 (Ist Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 966 (1971):
Boddie v. Connecticut, 286 F. Supp. 968 (D. Conn. 1968), rev'd, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Tamburro
v. Trama, 59 Misc. 2d 488, 299 N.Y.S.2d 528 (Westchester County Ct. 1969).
56. In re Smith, 323 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Colo. 1971); Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 58 Misc. 2d 1045,
296 N.Y.S.2d 74 (Sup. Ct. 1968), rev'd on other grounds. 38 App. Div. 2d 431, 330 N.Y.S.2d 550
(1972).
57. The Court had previously denied certiorari, over a strong dissent, in Williams v. Shaffer,
385 U.S. 1037 (1967) (Warren, C.J., Douglas & Brennan, JJ., dissenting), which presented the issue
in the context of a required eviction stay bond. The Boddie decision was reached only after a second
argument.
58. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
59. The Court indicated that filing fee requirements were valid exercises of state power, but
were invalid when they operated to deprive the indigent litigants of their constitutionally protected
right to due process.
60. Connecticut had no in forma pauperis statute and did not recognize the common-law
remedy.
61. "[W]e hold only that a State may not, consistent with the obligations imposed on it by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, pre-empt the right to dissolve this legal
relationship without affording all citizens access to the means it has prescribed for doing so." 401
U.S. at 383.
62. Mr. Justice Black filed the lone dissenting opinion, commenting: "This is a strange case
and a strange holding." Id. at 389. But see note 110 infra and accompanying text.
63. 401 U.S. at 380.
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ing that the Supreme Court "has seldom been asked to view access to
the courts as an element of due process,"64 the majority decided that

would-be litigants "faced with exclusion from the only forum effectively
empowered to settle their disputes"" were entitled to the same constitutional protection accorded involuntary defendants by the due process
clause. Crucial to the determination that the Boddie plaintiffs were
entitled to a procedural due process evaluation of the financial barriers

that prevented their access to the divorce courts was the state's monopoly over marriage and its dissolution. Because the Boddie petitioners
had no recognized, effective alternative to a state court proceeding, the
state's refusal to adjudicate their claimed right to a divorce amounted

to a de facto adjudication of that right-an adjudication that could
withstand constitutional challenge only if the petitioners had been given
a meaningful opportunity to be heard. The filing fee requirement, as
applied to indigent would-be plaintiffs, clearly operated to deny a hear-

ing; the majority was thus forced to consider the state's contention that
fee-conditioned access was nevertheless constitutionally adequate because the state interest in the discouragement of frivolous litigation and

the conservation of scarce judicial resources outweighed plaintiffs' interests in a hearing on their claimed right to a divorce. The frivolous
litigation argument was rejected, in part upon grounds relating to the
posture of the case as presented to the Court,"6 in part upon no-rationalrelationship grounds,67 and in part because of the existence of reasonable, alternative deterrents.68 Of greater significance, the resource alloca-

tion argument was flatly rejected on the authority of Griffin."5
64. Id. at 375.
65. Id. at 376.
66. That appellants sought to bring their divorce actions in good faith was not disputed by
the state.
67. The majority opinion stated that there is "no necessary connection between a litigant's
assets and the seriousness of his motives in bringing suit." 401 U.S. at 381. In a curious footnote
to this statement, the majority attempted to distinguish Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S.
541 (1949) (upholding the state's right to require security deposits of shareholders of less than a
minimum percentage of the stock of the corporation on whose behalf they sought to bring a
derivative suit), as involving only the validity of a statute on its face. 401 U.S. at 381 n.9. Not
only is this reading of Cohen questionable, see id. at 392 (Black, J., dissenting), but the majority
expressly declined to distinguish Cohen on the more obvious basis of the difference in the character
of the desired litigation. See note 144 infra.
68. The majority suggested as reasonable alternatives "penalties for false pleadings or affidavits, and actions for malicious prosecution or abuse of process, to mention only a few." Id. at 382.
This remark seems to be aimed directly at state legislatures. Cf Mars v. Luff, 186 S.E.2d 768
(W. Va. 1972) (requiring filing of divorce petition without fee payment upon affidavit of poverty
although affiants' own testimony contradicted affidavit; if affiants could in fact pay, "they should
be prosecuted for false swearing").
69. The Griffin plurality opinion did not mention the resource allocation argument, thus

1973]

INDIGENT ACCESS TO CIVIL COURTS

Despite the majority's adherence to established procedural due process methodology, by which a meaningful opportunity to be heard is
protected from the state's summary adjudicatory powers, 0 two Justices7 perceived a debilitating substantive element in the Court's reliance on the "fundamental" societal importance of the marital relationship in declaring a state statute invalid. If the majority opinion does in
fact represent a re-emergence of substantive due process, that term
surely must represent something other than the economic determinism
of Lochner v. New York,72 or even an anti-incorporationist search for
rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. 7 3 The societal value
placed upon the marital relationship was indeed used by the majority
in the balancing of interests required once the deprivation of a hearing
had been found. The "nature of . . . the private interest . . . affected," 74 however, has long been recognized as a necessary due process
variable to be weighed in the constitutional balance. The majority may
have departed from earlier due process decisions 75 with its finding of
'state action that adjudicates important rights ' 76 in the state's refusal
to adjudicate a dispute that private parties themselves cannot resolve
without action by the state. To characterize this departure as a kind of
strict scrutiny triggered by the character of the disputed right is to
confuse the reality of due process methodology with the form of equal

protection .71
allowing the inference that the plurality either found no rational relationship between resource
allocation and the duty to provide a fair trial or determined that the petitioners' interest outweighed the state's. If the latter was the case, one would expect the Boddie majority to have required a new balancing of interests. If the former is the correct interpretation of Griffin, however,
the transplantation of this concept into the civil litigation context could have far-reaching effects.
70. E.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Hovey v.
Elliott, 167 U.S. 409 (1897).
71. 401 U.S. at 385 (Douglas, J., concurring); Id. at 393-94 (Black, J., dissenting).
72. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
73. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
74. "[Clonsideration of what procedures due process may require under any given set of
circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function
involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action." Cafeteria
Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
75. Griffin may be read as recognizing due process violations in a refusal to adjudicate. See
note 53 supra.
76. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970).
77. As Michelman, supra note 53, emphasizes, "new" equal protection invalidations require
the infringement of a fundamental interest. As Justice Douglas recognized in Harper,however, the
Supreme Court has not "restricted due process to a fixed catalogue of. . . fundamental rights."
383 U.S. at 669. The mechanic of "new" equal protection invalidation, moreover, appears to differ
markedly from due process methodology. Once a "fundamental interest" and "invidious discrimination" have been found, "new" equal protection appears to endow the affected fundamental
interest with an absolute quantum of protection, unrelated to any relative scale of values of
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The majority limited its declaration of a constitutional right of

access to civil disputes that can legitimately be resolved only by the
courts. To Mr. Justice Brennan, this limitation was insupportable under
both due process and equal protection standards."' Because the "State

has an ultimate monopoly of all judicial process and attendant enforcement machinery,"79 and because any civil dispute, whether or not within
an area of law wholly under state control, may result in a stalemate that
can be resolved only by resort to the courts, Justice Brennan reasoned

that a denial of access in any such situation is tantamount to an adjudication of the disputed rights without a hearing. Similarly, from an equal
protection viewpoint, preconditioning the dispensation of justice upon
the prepayment of a fee is an unjustifiable abdication of the duty of the
courts to dispense equal justice to rich and poor alike. Restating this
second argument in more customary "new" equal protection terms,"0
access to the courts is a fundamental right which the state may deny to

a segment of the population only upon the showing of a compelling state
interest. Mr. Justice Douglas also reached his conclusions through a

"new" equal protection approach; however, he found strict judicial scru-

tiny to be required not by the presence of a fundamental interest but

rather because the state had invidiously discriminated on the basis of
wealth by creating a class defined by the "suspect" parameter of poverty. 81
V.

POSSIBLE EXPANSION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF

ACcEss

Although Boddie represents a signal triumph for the indigent civil
litigant, the narrow scope of the holding falls far short of establishing a
interests, against which the state's interest must be shown to be compelling if it is to prevail. No
such absolutist approach seems to inform the traditional procedural due process balancing of
interests, which proceeds instead on a generalized case-by-case investigation of competing values.
See generally Michelman, supra note 53. The unfortunate confusion of due process and equal
protection standards has led some courts to speak of Boddie as establishing an "overriding significance" test indistinguishable from the equal protection "compelling interest" test. See, e.g.,
Chidsey v. Guerin, 443 F.2d 584 (6th Cir. 1971); Wymelenberg v. Syman, 328 F. Supp. 1353, 1356
(E.D. Wis. 1971).
78. Justice Black later reached a similar conclusion in Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co.,
402 U.S. 954 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). See notes 108-10 infra and
accbmpanying text.
79. 401 U.S. at 387.
80. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
81. Justice Douglas analogized this discrimination to discrimination based on race. Although
he implies that racial discrimination need not infringe the exercise of a fundamental right to be
invalid under equal protection standards, the race discrimination cases are better viewed as involving the fundamental right to be free from racial discrimination. No other member of the Court
has suggested the existence of a fundamental right to be free from economic discrimination. See
generally Michelman, supra note 53.
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general constitutional guarantee of financially unrestricted access to the
civil courts. Boddie does, however, provide a sound foundation-in
practice, if not in articulation-for the gradual development of such a
right. The challenge will be to apply the Boddie rationale in successive
cases so as to invalidate serially the remaining financial barriers to civil
court access. This gradual expansion of the scope of Boddie's protection
for the indigent litigant can be achieved only by an erosion of the two
primary limiting criteria in that case: the requirement of a state monopoly over the subject matter of the desired litigation and the specific
financial barriers that the case involved.
A. Subject Matter Expansion
Mr. Justice Brennan stated unequivocally that he would place no
restrictions on the subject matter extension of Boddie to areas other
than divorce litigation. Although Justice Douglas made no similarly
explicit statement, it is difficult to find any limiting criteria in his condemning as invidiously discriminatory state procedures to which otherwise identically qualified poor litigants are denied the access available
to the more wealthy. Consideration of the possible subject matter expansion of Boddie's applicability therefore must focus on the defining
criterion of the majority opinion's due process rationale-the absence
of "recognized, effective alternatives" 2 to a civil court proceeding.
Minimally, Boddie will require a due process evaluation of financial restrictions on state court access in all areas of civil litigation requiring formal judicial approval of a voluntary alteration in legal status-including, for example, adoption proceedings 3 and adjudications
of incompetency. Because of the presence of an identical governmental
monopoly over dispute resolution, Boddie ought similarly to require a
due process evaluation of financial barriers to the enforcement of rights
created and governed wholly by federal statute. The sweeping applicability of the federal in forma pauperis statute, 5 however, will at present
82. 401 U.S. at 376.
83. Cf In re Adoption of a Child by M.W., 116 N.J. Super. 506, 283 A.2d 109 (1971)
(implying that Boddie applies to adoption proceedings although rejecting requested relief).
84. See Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954, 957 n.2 (1971).
85. "Any court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution or
defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment
of fees and costs or security therefor, by a person who makes affidavit that he is unable to pay
such costs or give security therefor." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1970). The statute expressly provides
that the indigent may have a trial transcript, service of process, witnesses, and assigned counsel.
28 U.S.C.
1915(b)-(d) (1970). There are deficiencies in the statute as interpreted by the courts.
See, e.g., S.O.U.P., Inc. v. FTC, 449 F.2d 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (holding that, despite the
amendment applying the statute to "persons" rather than "citizens," the statute does not allow in
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allow this issue to arise only"6 in voluntary petitions for discharge in
bankruptcy, which are expressly preconditioned on the payment of referees' fees.8 7 Prior to Boddie, the two courts that had considered the

constitutionality of this statutory access limitation reached opposite
conclusions; a similar conflict appears in the post-Boddie decisions. This
disparity of result is not a product of divergent judicial values imposed
on a balancing process, but rather of significantly different methods of
approaching the problem. The two pre-Boddie decisions considered the
access question solely in equal protection terms. In deciding In re
8 a federal circuit court determined
Garland,"
that bankruptcy does not
involve a fundamental right88 and that the required referee's fee does not

constitute an invidious discrimination. The court therefore applied an

"old" equal protection test, and found a rational basis for the discriminatory effects of the filing fee in the congressional decision to charge

the voluntary bankrupt for the discharge process in order to make the
bankruptcy system self-supporting. In In re Smith,"0 however, a federal
district court characterized access to the civil courts as a fundamental
right requiring the application of "new" equal protection standards.
Reasoning that the filing fee operated to deny this right to indigent
petitioners and that the government's financial interest in avoiding sub-

sidization of indigent bankruptcies was not compelling, the court held
the fee violative of the petitioners' equal protection rights. Subsequent

to Boddie, at least six federal district court decisions9' have declared the
forma pauperis proceedings by corporations); note 87 infra. For a discussion of the standard of
indigency under the statute see Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331 (1948).
86. But cf. Chidsey v. Guerin, 443 F.2d 584 (6th Cir. 1971) (involving bond requirement for
appeal from order of Secretary of Agriculture).
87. 11 U.S.C.
36(b)(2), 32(c)(8), 68(c)(1), 95(g) (1970). Despite theseemingly unrestricted
language of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1970), only one court has allowed a voluntary bankruptcy
proceeding under the in forma pauperis statute. In re Passwater, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 1 15,075
(S.D. Ind. 1971); cf. In re Read, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 1 15,079 (W.D.N.Y. 1971) (applying 28
U.S.C. § 1915 (1970) only after finding fee unconstitutional). But see In re Smith, 323 F. Supp.
1082, 1084-85 (D. Colo. 1971) (demonstrating congressional intent to exclude bankruptcy proceedings).
88. 428 F.2d 1185 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 966 (1971).
89. But see O'Brien v. Trevethan, 336 F. Supp. 1029 (D. Conn. 1972) (stating that the right
to a fresh start in life by a discharge in bankruptcy is fundamental).
90. 323 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Colo. 1971) (Arraj, C.J.). The court's approach to the access
problem is essentially the same as that of Justice Brennan in Boddie, but rather more forcefully
presented.
91. In re Haddock, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 51 15,565 (D. Conn. 1972) (relying wholly on
Boddie); In re Smith, 341 F. Supp. 1297 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Application of Ottman, 336 F. Supp.
746 (E.D. Wis. 1972): In re Naron, 334 F. Supp. 1150 (D. Ore. 1971); In re Read, 2 CCH Pov.
L. REP. 91 15,079 (W.D.N.Y. 1971) (relying wholly on Boddie); In re Kras, 331 F. Supp. 1207
(E.D.N.Y. 1971); cf. In re Passwater, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 1 15,075 (S.D. Ind. 1971) (allowing in
forma pauperis proceeding, seemingly in order to avoid constitutional issue). See also O'Brien v.
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Bankruptcy Act's fee requirement unconstitutional as it applies to indigent petitioners. Surprisingly, all but two of these courts based their
conclusions primarily on the Smith "new" equal protection approach
and invoked due process considerations only as a secondary justification
for invalidation. This reluctance to rely heavily on a due process argument may have resulted from doubts concerning the applicability of the
Boddie rationale to bankruptcy proceedings-doubts which proved decisive in the referee's decision upholding the fee requirement in In re
92 The point
Partilla.
of departure in the Partillaopinion was its characterization of the bankruptcy process not as a truly adversary court
proceeding, but as a governmentally provided administrative service
whose only beneficiary in a no-asset case is the petitioner; because the
bankruptcy court must discharge a petitioner who complies with the
statutory requirements, bankruptcy proceedings thus are judicial proceedings only in the sense that they are administered through the federal
courts. Partillaheld not only that bankruptcy proceedings lacked the
adjudicatory element93 necessary for application of procedural due process criteria to the referee's fee, but also that the voluntary petitioner
seeks only to avail himself of a conditional privilege extended by Congress as an act of legislative grace rather than to exercise a legal right.
Partillais almost unique among post-Boddie decisions in its apparent understanding of the defining criteria of the Boddie majority's due
process mechanic. Nevertheless, the conclusions drawn in Partillaare
open to substantial question. The right/privilege distinction upon which
those conclusions were partially based has been significantly eroded in
recent years. In Goldberg v. Kelly,94 the Supreme Court summarily
rejected the distinction as applied to welfare benefits, holding that
"[s]uch benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them."95 This emphasis on statutory entitlement should
prove adequate to demonstrate an enforceable legal right of the voluntary bankruptcy petitioner, whose status is explicitly defined as one of
entitlement in section 4(a) of the Bankruptcy Act.9" Moreover, the adjuTrevethan. 336 F. Supp. 1029 (D. Conn. 1972) (dictum declaring referee's orders transmittal fee
invalid on due process grounds).
92. 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 1 13,885 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). See also In re Malevich, No. Bk29-71
(D.N.J., April 21, 1971).
93. The referee apparently reasoned that even in an uncontested divorce, the court must find
an affirmative legal right to a dissolution of the marriage, while a bankruptcy referee may refuse
a discharge only if he finds that the negative technical requirements of the Act have not been met.
94. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
95. Id. at 262 (emphasis added). The Court cited with approval Reich, IndividualRights and
Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1255 (1965).
96. "Any person . . . shall be entitled to the benefits of this title as a voluntary bankrupt."
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dicative element, whose supposed absence was so strongly emphasized
in Partilla, is as clearly present in a bankruptcy proceeding as in an
uncontested divorce action; in each the only function of the court is the
essentially nondiscretionary exercise of its exclusive power to declare the
indigent moving party legally released from an otherwise inescapable
situation.
Any subject matter extension of Boddie beyond disputes whose
resolutions, even when consensual, may be effectuated only by judicial
imprimatur will require an increasingly narrow redefinition of "recognized, effective alternatives" for accomplishing by private means the
aims of would-be litigants. This will necessitate recognition of the principle that the only actual or theoretical possibilities that are significant
in assessing the applicability of due process standards are those alternative remedies that are as equally effective and legally acceptable as a
civil suit. Acceptance of this proposition was implicit in the majority
opinion in Boddie; neither the legally acceptable but ineffective alternatives of a separation or a continuation of the marital relationship, nor
the practically effective but legally discountenanced options of nonsupport, desertion, or illicit cohabitation with another were advanced as
viable alternatives to securing an unfettered right to remarry through
divorce. The extent to which the state will recognize private substitutes
for the judicial resolution of disputes, however, will vary inversely with
the extent of governmental involvement in those controversies. Governmental involvement may be either direct, when the state is, or has
become, the party opposing the would-be litigant, or indirect, when
there is a substantial governmental interest in regulating the exercise of
rights upon which a dispute focuses.
Direct state involvement in controversies between individuals is not
a static element. Landlord-tenant relationships, for example, may be
subject to extensive state regulatory legislation, but seldom directly
involve the state as a party to the formation, continuation, or dissolution
of a private lease agreement. Once lease covenants are allegedly
breached and the injured party institutes judicial proceedings, however,
the state becomes directly involved in the controversy. Since the state
will at that point refuse to recognize any extrajudicial attempt by the
defendant to protect his rights, "the judicial proceeding becomes the
only effective means of resolving the dispute at hand,"97 and the subject
II U.S.C. § 22(a) (1970). If this is viewed as a liberty right, see note 89 supra, the voluntary
petitioner arguably would have a stronger claim to access if an equal protection test is used than
the welfare recipients in Goldberg v. Kelly, whose interest was characterized as a property right.
See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
97. 401 U.S. at 376.
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matter criterion of Boddie is thus satisfied. Since this coalescence of
threatened deprivation and lack of alternatives will occur whenever di-

rect state involvement is invoked by bringing suit against an indigent
person, it seems clear that Boddie should require a due process evalua-

tion of the financial barriers facing all indigent civil defendants. 8 The
element of invoked direct state involvement deserves special consideration because it should also prove sufficient to guarantee a due process

evaluation of the cost barriers to the unsuccessful defendant's prosecution of an appeal. Similarly, the unsuccessful civil plaintiff should be
entitled to a due process scrutiny of the financial barriers to appellate
access because he, too, no longer has an alternative arena in which to

press his claim and to which the state will accord recognition in contradiction to its own res judicata determination that his position is insuffi-

cient. 9 Boddie can also be extended to protect indigents seeking to
proceed against either the state itself or a state agency or official on the

basis of inherent direct state involvement. Again, such an expansion can
be achieved by an emphasis on the lack of effective alternatives to civil
suit. As a practical matter, the alternatives available to any dissatisfied
party, in all but the limited class of private disputes that can be resolved
by retaking wrongfully held personalty, entail either the cooperation of

his adversary or the invocation of the adjudicative and enforcement
powers of the state. Thus, when the adversary is the state itself, a refusal
to adjudicate operates equally as a refusal to cooperate, and therefore

leaves the indigent with no recognized alternative remedy. From a
slightly different perspective, the state's refusal to adjudicate the dispute

indirectly affirms the status quo created by the action of the state, and
therefore operates as a denial of the indigent's claim to relief that is

equivalent to the practical adjudication of the would-be plaintiffs' right
to divorce in Boddie.0 0

98. Cf. State ex rel. Caulk v. Nichols, 281 A.2d 24 (Del. 1971), appeal dismissed, 408 U.S.
901 (1972) (denying relief from bond requirements after discussion of relator's access interest);
Myers v. Archuleta, I CCH Pov. L. REP. 1 662.953 (Idaho Dist. Ct. 1971) (common-law waiver
powers invoked, but unconstitutionality of defendant's filing fee noted).
99. Recognition of the direct state involvement inherent in the aftermath of an unsuccessful
prosecution or defense of a civil suit might also justify the independent invalidation of financial
barriers to appellate access on equal protection grounds similar to those involved in the criminal
appeals cases. See notes 49, 53 supra. In each case, the state may be viewed as enforcing its lower
court deprivation of the appellant's rights by denying him the review of those rights available to
the more affluent.
100. One argument raised in the lower court by the Boddie plaintiffs that was virtually
ignored by both courts might have special force in suits against the state. The plaintiffs contended
that the fee requirement infringed their first amendment right to petition for a redress of grievances.
Boddie v. Connecticut, 286 F. Supp. 968, 970 (D. Conn. 196.8). A similar argument was advanced
and ignored in In re Smith, 323 F. Supp. 1082, 1084-85 (D. Colo. 1971). This argument was
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Both inherent and invoked direct state involvement are present
when judicial review of a determination by a state administrative agency

is denied. 101 A state provision that conditions judicial review of administrative determinations upon the payment of a fee seems clearly to satisfy

the defining criteria of Boddie-the subject matter of the dispute is a
state-created right; the state has provided an exclusive mechanism for

the resolution of the dispute; and the state is involved in the dispute
directly through both the executive and judicial branches, as well as
indirectly through the legislature. 02

Although the factual situation in Boddie presented elements of both
direct and indirect state involvement, the Court emphasized the latter-the great extent of the state's concern with and regulation of marriage and its dissolution. It may be helpful to describe this state concern
as elevating marriage to the status of a "public right." The "public

right" characterization may serve two useful functions. First, the distinction between "public" and "fundamental" rights should help to forestall the nascent lower and state court confusion of the Boddie due
process approach and the "new" equal protection compelling interest
rejected summarily in Ortwein v. Schwab, 498 P.2d 757 (Ore. 1972) (welfare appeal filing fee),
and Jones v. Aciz, 289 A.2d 44, 55 (R.I. Sup. Ct. 1972) (denying waiver of appeal bond for trial
de novo of eviction proceeding).
101. When the "adversary party" in the administrative proceedings is an agency of the
government, as in a welfare hearing, the indigent would-be appellant should be able not only to
argue that his interests should be accorded great weight on the due process scale, but he also should
be able to advance a fairly convincing equal protection challenge to judicial review cost barriers.
Cf. Say v. Smith, 5 Wash. App. 677, 491 P.2d 687 (1971) (concurring opinion stating bond
requirement in welfare appeal violative of equal protection). When, however, the adversary in the
hearing is a private party and the cost requirement on review is a security bond to protect that
party's interest, as in a zoning appeal, state involvement is diminished and equal protection considerations lose much force. But cf. Damaskos v. Board of Appeal, 267 N.E.2d 897, 902 (Mass. 1971)
(partially remitting a zoning appeal bond for a nonindigent by statutory construction; the decision
indicated that both equal protection and due process considerations might otherwise have been
required).
102. The Supreme Court was confronted with this situation in a case involving welfare
recipients who were impeded by statutory filing fees in their attempts to challenge a state welfare
commission ruling. Frederick v. Schwartz, 296 F. Supp. 1321 (D. Conn. 1969). The Court vacated
an adverse lower court decision and remanded for consideration in light of Boddie. 402 U.S. 937
(197 1). This disposition of the case is perhaps of less significance than might appear, however, since
the lower court had based its decision on the precedent of its own earlier adverse decision in Boddie.
Compare Huffman v. Boersen, 406 U.S. 337, 338 (1972) (per curiam) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(appeal bond invalid under Boddie); Gatling v. Butler, 52 F.R.D. 389 (D. Conn. 1971) (invalidating
filing fee for juvenile delinquency appeal); Dorsey v. Hammond, 336 F. Supp. 380 (D. Md. 1971)
(waiver of filing fee and state payment for printed record in welfare appeal held constitutionally
required under Griffin and Boddie by Maryland Court ?f Appeals), with Chidsey v. Guerin, 443
F.2d 584 (6th Cir. 1971) (upholding double value bond for appeal from order of U.S. Secretary of
Agriculture); Ortwein v. Schwab, 498 P.2d 757 (Ore. 1972) (upholding filing fee for welfare appeal
against both due process and equal protection challenges).
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test. 0"' 3 Although the results reached by application of these two disparate methodologies may be the same when the contested right is indeed
fundamental, like the right to vote, 04 recognition of a due process right
to litigate a given case does not mean that state restrictions upon the
underlying contested right must be justified by a "compelling" state
interest; thus due process recognition should not be withheld out of a
fear that all fee-payment restraints on the exercise of the contested right
will thereby be removed. It surely would be foolhardy to argue, for
example, that the combined precedential force of Boddie and Harper
now forbids the required payment of marriage license fees by indigents.
Secondly, an emphasis on the public quality of the asserted rights should
properly direct attention from the extent of the government's procedural
regulation to the depth of the government's interest in their substantive
existence. This distinction can perhaps be made more meaningful by
considering as two examples the Federal Employers' Liability Act and
the fourteenth amendment. The former provides detailed procedures
regulating the method of litigating a dispute that essentially involves
only a common-law tort right and thus is amenable to all the possibilities for extrajudicial resolution that attend any common-law controversy. The latter, however, creates substantive rights of citizenship,
whose enforcement and protection must be a primary concern of national and state governments; these rights, whether or not deemed "fundamental," are therefore clearly "public." Thus, although governmental
interest in the protection of railroad employees is clearly evidenced by
FELA, the primacy of the fourteenth amendment permits no recognition of alternatives to civil litigation that fail to provide fully equal
remedies for the violation of civil rights. The question of Boddie's applicability to a constitutional claim solely because of indirect state involvement, however, seldom will be presented, largely because most
such claims will involve the state directly as the opposing party. Moreover, a state court challenge to purely private discrimination under the
thirteenth amendment could still fall outside the Boddie rationale because of the ready availability of the federal courts-with their sweeping
in forma pauperis statute-as alternative fora. There is, however, an
intriguing possible application of Boddie to a public-right claim; it has
been suggested0 5 that a would-be plaintiff who has no adequate state
103. See note 77 supra.
104. Bynum v. Connecticut Comm'n on Forfeited Rights, 410 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1969)
(invalidating filing fee requirement as applied to indigent ex-convict seeking to regain his franchise).
105. Note. The ConstitutionalImplications of the JurisdictionalAmount Provision in Injunction Suits Against FederalOfficers, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 1474 (1971).
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court remedy' cannot constitutionally be barred from a federal forum
by the 10,000-dollar jurisdictional amount. Whatever may be the merits
of this position, it is most probable that the Court will avoid confronting
the issue-and thus the possibility of a confrontation with Congress-and will instead avail itself of another, less disruptive means of
disposing of any such challenge." 7
A gradual subject matter expansion of the Boddie due process
rationale to statutorily regulated private claims of a common-law nature
conceivably could be achieved through either of two theoretical approaches to the access issue. The first would be to infer from extensive
regulation of basic common-law rights a governmental intent to create
a new statutory public right to replace the old common-law action, and
then to infer from that creation a state refusal to recognize private
substitutes for the enforcement of the right through the judicial process.
The second approach would be to infer from the fact of regulation a
legislative determination that the previous remedies, which have become
the alternatives to judicial resolution after enactment of the statutory
regulations, were ineffective; hence, as a matter of substantive law, these
remedies could not be considered as recognized alternatives. The former
approach might prove more suitable in challenging financial barriers
that block access to state court prosecution of claims under a remedial
federal statute like FELA; the latter, however, would be more suited to
support an attack on cost requirements in actions, such as eviction or
replevin proceedings, in which the statutory regulation was presumably
an exercise of the state's police power designed to prevent the socially
undesirable results of peace-endangering private remedies. Each of these
suggested approaches, however, is vulnerable to the argument that the
regulatory statute was designed merely to reform the pre-existing judicial mechanism for resolving the affected disputes.
Although no court has yet attempted to push Boddie to the outer
limits of purely private contract or negligence claims, two Justices have
stated that they see no limiting criteria whatever within the reasoning
of the Boddie majority. In his concurrence, Mr. Justice Brennan rejected the majority's implied suggestion that purely private suits may
always be settled out of court, adopting the more pragmatic view that
the institution of a nonfrivolous lawsuit is almost by definition the result
106. See Murray v. Vaughn, 300 F. Supp. 688, 695 (D.R.I. 1969) (extending jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970) in suit to enjoin federal officials despite serious question of failure
to meet jurisdictional amount requirement, impliedly to avoid article III, § 2, and fifth amendment
challenges).
107. See generally Note, supra note 105.
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of an exhaustion of private alternative remedies. In a later opinion, Mr.
Justice Black urged a far more fundamental justification for recognizing
a right of access broad enough to invalidate any payment requirement
applied to an indigent litigant seeking to press his legal claim. Justice
Black's fundamental observation was that, as "[e]very law student
learns in the first semester of law school," ' legal rights have meaning
only to the extent that the state will enforce them. From this premise
he reasoned that the Boddie majority's emphasis on the exclusivity of
the judicial remedy for divorce plaintiffs "is no limitation at all," 1 9
because unhampered access to the judicial process is the only means by
which disputed rights can be meaningfully protected. He concluded: "In
my view, the decision in Boddie v. Connecticut can safely rest on only
one crucial foundation-that the civil courts of the United States and
each of the States belong to the people of this country and that no
person can be denied access to those courts, either for a trial or an
appeal, because he cannot pay a fee, finance a bond, risk a penalty, or
afford to hire an attorney.""' 0
B.

The FinancialBarrierExpansion

Prior to considering the constitutional validity of the various
classes of financial barriers to civil court access, it is necessary to realize
that the rights imperiled by financial obstacles, even in suits within the
subject matter ambit of the Boddie majority's due process rationale, are
not necessarily coextensive with those affected by a criminal prosecution; the felt necessity of sedulously protecting the criminal defendant
from any abuse of state prosecutorial powers embodied in the Constitution may not apply to civil litigation. For this reason, consideration of
the applicability of Boddie to various financial barriers must be prefaced
with the caveat that the catalogue of procedural rights constitutionally
guaranteed to the criminal defendant by past Supreme Court decisions
may not be assumed to have been automatically guaranteed to the civil
litigant by force of the Boddie decision. Each class of financial burdens
must be examined to determine whether it is invidiously discriminatory
or otherwise threatens a fundamental interest sufficiently to demand
strict judicial scrutiny; whether the state nevertheless may be able to
demonstrate a compelling interest in maintaining the requirement; and
whether "the precise nature of the government function involved""' is
108.
109.
110.
111.

Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954, 956 (1971).

Id.
Id. at 955-56.
Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
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such as to make the cost requirements meet the standards of due process.

112

1. Fees.-Boddie holds unequivocally that the state may no

longer demand payment of a filing fee by an indigent plaintiff as an
absolute condition precedent to suit for divorce."' This is not to suggest, however, that Boddie invalidated all filing fee requirements; the

constitutional status of such fees in contexts other than divorce litigation
may be open to question. One specific area in which this question seems
likely to arise is the challenge to the referee's fee requirement in voluntary bankruptcy petitions." 4 It might be argued in defense of the fee that

"the entry of the United States into the installment credit business""'
presently provides the indigent petitioner a meaningful opportunity to

be heard because it allows him up to nine months after filing his petition
to raise the requisite 50-dollar fee."' This position loses its force, how-

ever, when applied to the continuously impoverished petitioner. Dismissal of a voluntary petition for failure to pay the required fee is
generally assumed, through principles of res judicata, to bar a subsequent discharge of the previously scheduled debts.' As a result, the
indigent petitioner is actually faced with the threat of a binding adjudication that entails consequences far more severe than the mere continuance of the status quo that followed the state's denial of a hearing in

Boddie. Even if the Judicial Conference's proposal that a dismissal for
nonpayment of fees be without prejudice unless otherwise stated1 " were
adopted, it is unlikely that a previously dismissed petitioner would find
112. The due process discussion of financial barriers must proceed on 2 assumptions; first,
that the desired litigation will be found to fall within the subject matter limits of Boddie; and
secondly, that the indigent's interest in some way will involve the reasonable necessities of normal
life. Positing a uniformly heavy weight on the indigent's side of the constitutional balance does
not indicate that the Boddie majority's due process approach reduces to something of a compelling
interest test; the presumption is rather one of necessity for orderly discussion, and is supported by
the great preponderance of indigent litigation.
113. Cf. Robertson v. Robertson, 261 So. 2d 336 (La. Ct. App. 1972) (invalidating the
Louisiana in forma pauperis statute's express exclusion of divorce actions as void on its face).
114. See notes 87-96 supra and accompanying text. Because the referee's fee is as "invidiously discriminatory" and as effective in blocking court access as any other financial barrier, the
only remaining question of its possible validity would arise under a due process balancing approach.
115. In re Barlean, 279 F. Supp. 260 (D. Mont. 1968).
116. I1 U.S.C., General Order in Bankruptcy 35, § 4(a) (1970).
117. See Perlman v. 322 W. Seventy-Second St. Co., 127 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1942); In re
Barlean, 279 F. Supp. 260 (D.Mont. 1968); In re McDonald, 61 F. Supp. 133 (D. Mass. 1945).
See generally I W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 1 2.48 (14th ed. 1971).
118. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY RULES AND OFFICIAL

FORMS UNDER CHAPTERS I TO VII OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT 42 (1971). The Committee would
also, however, reduce the maximum allowable time for paying the fee to 6 months. Id. at 12.
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the court willing to allow him a second discretionary installment period

in which to pay the fee; as a practical matter, the continuously indigent
petitioner thus would remain liable to his creditors, just as the wouldbe plaintiffs in Boddie remained legally bound to unwanted spouses.
Indeed, the assumption that availability of the nine-month installment
period alone operates to render meaningful the petitioner's opportunity
to be heard may itself be subject to direct challenge.' Although the
voluntary petitioner is adjudicated a bankrupt at the time of filing, he
is effectively denied the substantial legal benefit of this adjudication-a

fresh start in life-until he pays for his discharge. This circumstance
strongly suggests that the prepayment hearing and adjudication is no
more than a meaningless formality until the fees are paid."' A possible

justification for the present anomalous situation of a petitioner too poor
to "go bankrupt" is the governmental interest in preventing the abuses
that originally led to the passage of the Referees' Salary Act of 1946,121
which not only abolished the fee system of referee compensation but
also repealed the then-existing in forma pauperis provisions of the Bankruptcy Act. The very real evils of the former compensation system,
however, were largely unrelated to the in forma pauperis provision; a
close examination of the Referees' Salary Act discloses only two logical
bases for the present payment-conditioned discharge. 22 The first of
these is a continuing desire to make the bankruptcy system self-

supporting-a desire that not only seems impossible to achieve without
a sizable increase in the present fee amounts,11 but that is also irrelevant to a consideration of the due process rights of the bankrupt under

the Boddie interpretation of Griffin. ' The second possible justification
for maintaining the present procedure is the governmental desire to
avoid the potentially destructive administrative burdens of adjudicating

in forma pauperis eligibility and monitoring the future collectibility of
deferred fee payments. This argument, however, also seems insufficient
119. Cf Earls v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. 3d 109, 490 P.2d 814, 98 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1971)
(rejecting the contention that in forma pauperis divorce proceedings may be disallowed because
the indigent will eventually be able to accumulate sufficient savings to pay filing fees; "Indigents
are entitled not merely to access to the courts but to timely access. They may not be subjected to
unreasonable delays in securing fundamental rights solely by reason of their poverty.").
120. Cf Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (the opportunity to be heard "must
be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner").
121. Act of June 28, 1946, ch. 512, 60 Stat. 323 (codified in II U.S.C.).
122. See Shaeffer, Proceedings in Bankruptcy In Forma Pauperis, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1203
(1969).
123. U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS 202 (1970). "[T]he principle
of a self-supporting bankruptcy system is outmoded and should be abandoned." Id.
124. See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
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to overbalance the petitioner's interest. Bankruptcy courts are uniquely

suited to determine the financial status of in forma pauperis petitioners;
moreover, the significant administrative delays occasioned by the pres-

ent installment system 125 could be reduced appreciably by granting an
immediate in forma pauperis discharge and following it, if the referee's
fees were not simply waived, by periodic checks on the bankrupt's ability to repay. 2 Although the Supreme Court declined an opportunity to
consider the validity of the Bankruptcy Act's fee requirement by deny-

ing certiorari in In re Garland,2 1 it has responded to the increasing
pressure of inferior court challenges and allowed an appeal from one of
28
the recent lower court invalidations.1
The constitutional status of required payments other than filing
fees may also be suspect under the rationale of the Boddie majority. The
majority's discussion of reasonable, less expensive alternatives to offi-

cial service of process and notice by publication 2 1 may indicate that, in
the absence of significantly less expensive alternatives, the state's justifi-

cation for requiring these payments-that the expenditures for notice
125. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 118, at 13 (proposing
a reduction of the standard fee payment deferral period to 4 months with a maximum of 6 months
because the "administrative cost of installments in excess of 4 is disproportionate to the benefits
conferred, and prolongation of the period of payment beyond 6 months after bankruptcy causes
undesirable delays in administration").
126. But see In re Garland, 428 F.2d 1185, 1188 (1st Cir. 1970) (suggesting that an investigation of true indigence would be a heavy administrative burden). Garland also suggests that the
predicted cost to the bankruptcy system of total waiver of fees in no-asset cases would be about
$3,000,000 annually. Id.
127. 402 U.S. 966 (1971).
128. In re Kras, 331 F. Supp. 1207 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), prob.juris. noted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3385
(Feb. 22, 1972). Two reflections on the indigent's interest in a voluntary bankruptcy must be noted.
The Garlandcourt suggested that "no-asset" bankrupts were either trying to conceal true assets
or were hoping first to rid themselves of their creditors in the expectation of future assets. Such a
misanthropic outlook hardly seems justified. In Kras, petitioner is seeking a bankruptcy discharge
to thwart the condemnatory references of his former employer, an insurance company several
thousand dollars of whose premiums petitioner claims were stolen from him. If these proceeds were
in fact stolen, the Garlandcourt's rejection of bankruptcy's avowed purpose of giving petitioners
a fresh start in life seems especially harsh. A second aspect of the draconian opinion in Garland
was its insistence that utter destitution was the standard of indigence that ought to be employed if
in forma pauperis proceedings in bankruptcy were to be constitutionally required. This view was
considered and emphatically rejected in In re Smith, 323 F. Supp. 1082, 1091-92 (D. Colo. 1971).
Smith suggested a far more reasonable constitutional standard of indigence-the inability to
"afford to live from day to day and also pay the cost of a court filing fee ...." Id. at 1092.
129. "[W]e think that reliable alternatives exist to service of process by a state-paid sheriff
if the State is unwilling to assume the cost of official service. This is perforce true of service by
publication which is the method of notice least calculated to bring to a potential defendant's
attention the pendency of judicial proceedings. . . . We think in this case service at defendant's
last known address by mail and posted notice is equally effective as publication in a newspaper."
401 U.S. at 382.
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and process are necessary to protect the due process rights of the other
party to the litigation and should therefore be made by the party who
has occasioned the necessity for protection-might have prevailed. In

view of the obvious thrust of the Boddie majority's reasoning, such an
interpretation seems forced as it applies to fees paid to an agency of the
court.' This class of fees is distinguishable, however, from those required by statute to be paid to private parties. The distinction, which of
necessity rests on the state's asserted inability to control the amount of

the "private" costs, 13' as well as its financial disinterest in their payment, does not seem material for equal protection purposes because
these costs are unquestionably state requirements operating to withhold
equal access to the judicial process from the poor. It may, however, have

constitutional significance under the Boddie majority's due process test.
The due process argument would be that since these fees are required
not for any direct state benefit but rather for the protection of the state's
citizens, they possess a greater weight in the due process balance-a

weight sufficient to offset the necessitating party's right to be heard;
130. Subsequent cases appear to bear this out. See, e.g., Joyner v. Maryland, I CCH Pov.
L. REP. 1 662.38 (Md. Cir. Ct. 1971) (no discussion of alternatives to remission of court costs
despite search for alternatives to extrajudicial payments); Wilson v. Wilson, 218 Pa. Super. 344,
280 A.2d 665 (1971) (remission of fees and court costs and free service of process allowed without
discussion of alternatives); ef Indigent Divorce-Administrative Memorandum, 2 CCH Pov. L.
REP. 13,932 (Pa. C.P. 1971) (adopting as part of standard procedure payment of any service fees).
But see Lloyd v. Third Judicial Dist. Court, 27 Utah 2d 322, 495 P.2d 1262 (refusing to allow
indigent divorce plaintiff to proceed without payment of costs of publication because of lack of
statutorily permitted less expensive alternatives), on remandfrom 404 U.S. 1035 (1972).
Those courts that have accepted the constitutional obligation to provide plaintiffs with the
necessary service upon their opponents have in turn been faced with the difficult problem of
deciding how and to whom to allocate the financial burden. The confusion in the lower courts in
New York is instructive. It was at first assumed that payment of publication costs should be made
from city and county treasuries in Dorsey v. City of New York, 66 Misc. 2d 464, 321 N.Y.S.2d
129 (Sup. Ct. 1971). This decision was overturned in Jackson v. Jackson, 37 App. Div. 2d 953,
326 N.Y.S.2d 224 (1971), in which the First Department ruled that the state must bear the expense
and that, because the state was not a party to the divorce proceeding, plaintiff's only remedy was
to sue the state in the Court of Claims. This position was subsequently adopted by the Second
Department in Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 38 App. Div. 2d 431, 330 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1972). The Third and
Fourth Departments, however, continued to adhere to the view that payment of publication costs
was the burden of the city or county. Deason v. Deason, 39 App. Div. 2d 331, 334 N.Y.S.2d 236
(1972); McCandless v. McCandless, 38 App. Div. 2d 171, 327 N.Y.S.2d 896 (1972). Meanwhile,
county supreme courts occasionally followed the suggestion advanced in Boddie and ordered
service by mailing to defendant's last known address, a solution condemned as violative of state
law by all 4 departments. See, e.g., Prince v. Prince, 69 Misc. 2d 410, 329 N.Y.S.2d 963 (Sup. Ct.
1972).
131. See Harris v. Harris, 424 F.2d 806, 813 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970)
(a pre-Boddie decision ordering minimum allowable notice because state had no other way to
control the cost). Because the free market pricing concept implicit in this distinction is in many
instances inapplicable, see text following note 5 supra, it should be possible to argue that the state
is directly answerable for the pricing policies of these private parties.
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moreover, when the state is powerless to reduce the cost of protecting
the indigent's opponent, it is unreasonable, hence not constitutionally
required, to permit the indigent necessitating party to escape this burden
32
entirely and thrust it instead on the otherwise uninvolved state fisc.

A greater danger in placing undue emphasis on Boddie's discussion
of less expensive alternatives may lie in the state's potential willingness
to reduce the extent of its obligation to assume the indigent's financial
burden by dispensing "cut-rate justice" to indigent litigants. Indications

of such an attitude may be found in recent decisions. In Hotel Martha
3 3 a New York appellate
Washington Management Co. v. Swinick,1

court remanded for a determination of the necessity to the presentation
of the defendant's case of certain witnesses whose fees and subpoena
expenses the court had determined would have to be borne by the state.
In a Maryland case, an indigent divorce plaintiff was denied a statutory
election of a more expensive alternative to a hearing of her case before

a judge.

34

The latter decision is also one of many to find, on the

authority of Boddie, that the state could validly provide a less expensive
method of serving process than that generally required of nonindigent
plaintiffs.'35 Although these decisions may have been quite reasonable,

a pattern of such notice short cuts could conceivably raise constitutional
questions involving both due process and equal protection charges that

systematic state lowering of notice standards adversely affects the rights
of defendants in actions brought by indigent plaintiffs. Such collateral
attacks on procedural grounds, even if unsuccessful, would subject the
indigent to time-consuming and potentially harassing extraneous litiga-

tion that could in turn raise constitutional questions about the adequacy
of the protection given the indigent litigant by the state's original as132. Cf. Cohen v. Board of Supervisors, 20 Cal. App. 3d 236, 97 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1971)
(where state has assumed no responsibility for notice by publication, divorce plaintiff cannot make
state pay these fees; service by mail suggested as only possible remedy).
133. 66 Misc. 2d 833, 322 N.Y.S.2d 139 (App. T. 1971).
134. Joyner v. Maryland, I CCH Pov. L. REP.
662.38 (Md. Cir. Ct. 1971). Plaintiff had
requested the services of an examiner-master in lieu of a hearing before a judge. But cf. Dorsey v.
Hammond, 336 F. Supp. 380 (D. Md. 1971) (reporting order of Maryland Court of Appeals
refusing petitioner's request to appeal on typewritten extract of record and ordering state to pay
for full printed briefs and record; added state expenses held insufficient reason for departure from
established, salutary court rule); Hart v. Superior Court, 16 Ariz. App. 184, 492 P.2d 433 (1971)
(ordering county to pay for transcript).
135. See also Lynch v. Lynch, 1 CCH Pov. L. REP.
662.801 (Cal. Super. 1971) (allowing
notice by mail "because" plaintiff was indigent); Miserak v. Terrill, 285 A.2d 753, 755 (Vt. Sup.
Ct. 1971) ("manner of service. . . rests wholly within the power of the trial court"). But see Hart
v. Superior Court, 16 Ariz. App. 184, 492 P.2d 433 (1971) (requiring the county to pay full
publication costs because Arizona had no law authorizing service by mail; court refused to read
Boddie as overcoming fabric of state's procedural rules).
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sumption of the publication fees. Moreover, procedural short cuts may
be subject to direct constitutional attack. When the state provides alternative means of satisfying procedural requirements, the indigent's
forced election of the less expensive procedure would seem to call for a
determination that the assigned procedure assures the indigent as much
protection as the one forbidden him. It may be argued, however, that
the forced election has deprived the indigent of his right to the equal
protection of the laws even when the elected alternative adequately
safeguards his due process rights, if it can be shown that the forbidden
alternative would have given him a more effective opportunity to present
his case.'36
2. Costs.-Despite the vulnerability of fee barriers under the
Boddie rationale, it is difficult to perceive in the case any foundation
for attacking the taxation of costs. Under due process standards, costs
appear to be constitutionally permissible both because they do not operate to deny an opportunity to be heard 37 and because the indigent's
interest in being free from the chilling effects of costs seems hardly to
outweigh the interest of all litigants in being compensated for the expense of litigational vexation. Further, neither of the equal protection
arguments advanced in the Boddie concurring opinions provides support
for a costs challenge, primarily because costs statutes do not establish
conditions of access nor do they affect rich and poor differently in any
meaningful way.
Superficially similar to the costs problem is the question whether
the state may constitutionally condition the indigent's access to its civil
courts upon his promise of eventually repaying the fees that the state is
required by Boddie to assume. The essential distinction between costs
and deferred fees, however, is that the deferred fee liability is exacted,
not to protect any interest of the indigent's opponent, but rather to
safeguard the state treasury. This problem confronted the federal courts
that invalidated payment of the referee's fee as a condition precedent
to obtaining a voluntary discharge in bankruptcy. These courts have
concluded that it is proper to embody in the referee's final order, if the
discharge is granted, "an order resembling a judgment for costs' 3 " to
136. In Griffin a transcript was ordered because the more wealthy could have one, despite
the Court's recognition of the principle that the state had no duty even to provide an appeal process.
Presumably the inferior review first given the Griffin petitioners would have raised no constitutional issue had a better alternative not existed.
137. Cf In re Adoption of a Child by M.W., 116 N.J. Super. 506, 283 A.2d 109 (1971)
(upholding costs judgment of state investigatory agency where grant of adoption was not conditioned upon payment).
138. In re Smith, 323 F. Supp. 1082, 1093,(D. Colo. 1971). See notes 90-91 supra and
accompanying text.
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become effective only upon a subsequent improvement in the petitioner's financial status that would enable him to pay the fee without
undue hardship. There is no apparent constitutional objection to such
an indefinite deferral of required fee repayment. The indigent has been
allowed free access to the courts in order to pursue his legal claim to
final adjudication and is subjected to no unequal treatment when his
eventual repayment of costs is conditioned upon his ability to repay.
When, however, repayment is deferred for a fixed time or made a precondition to the exercise of other rights, different constitutional issues
arise. If, for example, the courts were to retain the power of a capias
execution 39 or a contempt commitment for nonpayment of costs at the
end of the deferral period, the indigent litigant would seem to have both
a convincing equal protection argument and a valid contention that, by
requiring him to risk loss of liberty as a condition of access to the civil
courts, the state has failed to meet the minimum standards of due
process. 4 ' A similar contention doubtlessly would prevail when the state
is able to levy upon the indigent's property for the amount of the deferred costs at the expiration of the fixed repayment period. The problems raised by establishing repayment of costs as a condition precedent
to the exercise of other rights are presented most vividly in a recent
Indiana divorce case' 4 ' in which the court, after originally allowing
plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis, issued an order forbidding the
subsequent issuance of a marriage license to either party until the accrued costs of the divorce action had been paid by defendant. When
plaintiff appealed this order on due process and equal protection
grounds, the court revised its order to assess the costs to both parties
jointly and severally but left the marriage license provision intact. In
view of the Supreme Court's frequent characterization of marriage as
a fundamental right,"'. and its apparent definition of divorce as an action to secure the right to remarry,' this order probably would fail to
withstand either a due process or an equal protection attack. Nevertheless, were the right involved less "fundamental" than marriage, it is
arguable that the state could validly add as a condition of its exercise
the repayment of outstanding court costs.
139. See Yoder v. County of Cumberland, 278 A.2d 379 (Me. 1971).
140. Cf. Strange v. James, 323 F. Supp. 1230 (D. Kan. 1971) (a criminal case invalidating
state procedure for collecting expense of assigned counsel from indigent prisoner as chilling sixth
amendment right), aff'd on other grounds, 407 U.S. 128 (1972).
141. Anderson v. Anderson, 1 CCH Pov. L. REP.
662.48 (Ind. Cir. Ct. 1971).
142. E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,
316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
143. 401 U.S. at 376.
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3. Security bonds.-The applicability of Boddie to security bonds
is beset with difficulties. The litigational interests subject to bond demands are of infinite variety; the complexity of the problem, moreover,
is increased significantly by jurisdictional differences in the statutory
requirements. Thus, treatment of the constitutional validity of bond
requirements must be restricted to general considerations. In the discussion that follows there will be no attempt to segregate cost bond considerations from those involved in possessory bond challenges. Although
possessory bond cases more sharply present the competing interests in
the conduct of the underlying litigation, and more strongly emphasize
the procedural posture of the parties, the fundamental obstacles facing
a challenge to the underlying security bond justification of disinterested
state protection of an opposing party are virtually identical in both cost
and possessory bond cases.'
The constitutional status of requiring defendants' security bonds in
eviction and replevin actions presents perhaps the thorniest problem in
the right-of-access thicket. In an eviction proceeding, the defendant will
be summarily dispossessed of his home and left without shelter for
himself and his family unless-depending on the particular statutory
requirement-he provides security for the rental payments as they accrue, the entire rental value for the estimated duration of the litigation,
or twice the entire rental value. In a replevin action, the defendant must
likewise post a re-replevin bond for the value, or more often twice the
value, of the replevied goods or forego their possession, which may
entail the loss of livelihood,' for the duration of the litigation. Yet
without provision of security, the eviction plaintiff, who may himself be
far from affluent, may lose the rental value of the premises for the
duration of the litigation and undergo the risk of damage or destruction
to his property; the replevin plaintiff faces the same dangers, magnified
by the greater ease of disposability and concealment of movable property.
Due process and equal protection attacks on defendants' security
bonds will each begin with the observation that there is no essential
distinction between the criminal defendant faced with the potential loss
of liberty and property, and the eviction/replevin defendant faced with
the loss of property upon which the reasonable enjoyment of his liberty
144. When the state's interest in a cost bond requirement is not merely representative,
however, a very different conclusion may be compelled. For example, in light of the clear presentation of the competing interests in Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), it seems
quite likely that exclusionary security requirements for minority stockholders seeking to institute
derivative suits would continue to withstand attack on due process grounds.
145. See, e.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
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may depend. Due process methodology would then require a determination whether, under the circumstances, the security bond procedures
afford the indigent defendant a meaningful opportunity to be heard,
although in fact these procedures operate to deny him a present hearing.
The factors to be weighed would be the defendant's interest in retaining
the property pending final adjudication and the governmental interest
to be served by insisting on the bond procedure, which perforce would
in large part represent that of the plaintiff in protecting his rights to the
property." 6 Similarly, equal protection analysis would necessitate a determination whether the interest of the state as representative of the
plaintiff is sufficient to compel approval of the state's discrimination
against the indigent defendant's interest in presenting his case. Because
the balance of interests that seems to be required by both due process
and equal protection will shift as different variables are introduced, it
is unlikely that any court would venture a blanket approval or disapproval of security bond requirements; a case-by-case approach, using
either equal protection or due process criteria, seems far more likely.
Only one court has held the requirement of a security bond to be an
unconstitutional deprivation of fourteenth amendment rights as applied
to an indigent defendant, and that case involved a challenged deed
construction rather than an alleged default in payment. 47 Defendant
was unable to present her claim in the dispossessory action because she
was too poor to post a bond, and for the same reason was unable to
appeal from the resultant summary judgment. Although the court invalidated the bond requirement on equal protection grounds, the opinion
appears to have adopted a narrow definition of "state interest" that
excluded the state's representation of the plaintiff's interest. It is arguable that this restrictive definition was both incorrect and unnecessary,
for there is no indication in the opinion of any circumstance involving
danger to the property or loss of income sufficient to make the plaintiffs
interest in the security overriding. Other cases have avoided the constitutional issue. One federal district court, for example, has issued a
temporary restraining order to arrest eviction proceedings pending determination by a three-judge federal court of the constitutionality of
security bonds.' A lower state court has also discussed the constitutional issues raised by bond requirements under a replevin statute, but,
because of the tremendous impact that a declaration of invalidity would
have on commercial transactions and existing security interests assumed
146.
147.
148.

See Jones v. Aciz, 289 A.2d 44 (R.I. Sup. Ct. 1972) (discussing the competing interests).
Harrington v. Harrington, 269 A.2d 310 (Me. 1970).
Hayes v. Fellowship Gardens, Inc., 1 CCH Pov. L. REP.
2355.21 (N.D. Ind. 1971).
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in reliance on existing protection procedures, the court refused to pass
on the constitutional question and instead reserved it for review on
appeal.' The issue has been only partially resolved by the Supreme
Court. In a challenge to a forcible entry and detainer statute requiring
security for the rental value pending trial and double security on appeal,
the Court invalidated the second increment of the appeal bond as having
no necessary connection with the extent of appellee's risk of loss, but
did not question the bond requirement in the eviction proceedings. 50
This treatment of the basic bond challenge was ambiguous, however, in
that the Court dealt with the problem solely in terms of equal protection
and emphasized that it was not considering the validity of the statute
as applied.'' Moreover, the Court failed to articulate any readily applicable standards by which to evaluate defendants' bond requirements.
Despite the difficulties in generalizing about the constitutional validity of defendants' security bonds, certain distinctions can be made.
Supersedeas bonds required in eviction proceedings, for example, appear more open to attack then re-replevin bonds, both because a defendant's interest in shelter is generally greater, and certainly no less, than
in his personal possessions, and because the danger to plaintiff's permanent possessory right is less when the property cannot be concealed or
removed. A plaintiffs affirmative interest in possession of the realty
during the litigation, however, also is greater than his interest in the
possession of contested personalty; while the primary value of realty is
in rents, personalty can rarely be rented and, when sold, its "used"
condition reduces its value considerably. A fair distinction might therefore be drawn between those eviction cases in which the defendant
claims absolute ownership vis-a'-vis the plaintiff and those in which the
defendant challenges the collectibility of an admitted continuing money
obligation, on grounds, for example, that his lessor has not performed
repair covenants. In the latter cases, which might be expected to predominate among those involving indigent defendants, there appears to
be no constitutional argument against requiring that the admittedly
owed rental payments be deposited into a court-administered escrow
fund as they become due;'5 2 it is not likely, however, that there would
149. Almor Furniture & Appliances, Inc. v. Macmillan, 116 N.J. Super. 65, 280 A.2d 862
(Dist. Ct. 1971).
150. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
151. The Court apparently did not consider a possible unconstitutional application to the
tenants, who were admittedly indigent, because the lower court had declared the statute unconstitutional on its face. Lindsey may also be distinguishable because the statutory scheme provided for
a rudimentary hearing before an ouster of the tenant would be authorized. See Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67, 85 n.15 (1972).
152. Cf Cockrell v. B & S Concrete Supply, 477 S.W.2d 9 (Tenn. 1972) (upholding required
deposit of workmen's compensation settlement before challenge to award is permitted).
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be a compelling interest in requiring these payments to be made in a
lump sum before trial.5 3 A similar conclusion could be reached in replevin cases when the indigent defendant seeks to withhold conditional
sales payments in order to force consideration of such complaints as
breach of warranty or truth-in-lending violations. When ownership is
at issue, however, a different approach seems called for. The Court
might well accept the constitutional validity of security requirements
when the danger to plaintiffs interest is significant or when defendant's
claim of ownership is frivolous or harassing. Rather than rely on an
endless case-by-case adjudication of the merits of requiring security
in a variety of circumstances, however, the Court could more easily, in
accordance with its recent due process decisions, 5 ' require that security
be ordered only after a preliminary hearing on the existence and extent
of the threat to plaintiff's property interest. Such a procedure has recently been mandated by a federal circuit court,'55 with apparent
success. 56
The replevin or summary dispossession plaintiff appears to occupy
a fundamentally different status than a defendant to such actions. The
plaintiff comes voluntarily into court, and thus cannot call upon the
essential resemblance to the unwilling defendant that lay at the root of
the Boddie majority's reasoning. Because, however, a convincing argument may be made that the procedural posture of the parties does not
necessarily reflect a true aggressor-defender relationship,'5 7 a more important distinction between the parties must be noted. The eviction/replevin plaintiff is not protecting a present possessory interest, but
is rather actively attempting to obtain summary state aid in depriving
the defendant of the peaceable enjoyment of the contested property.
Thus, although the defendant's possession may in fact be wrongful, a
security bond is required-not to allow the plaintiff to maintain a possessory status quo, and thereby protect existing rights dependent upon
possession-but rather to effect, through seizure or eviction, a radical
shift in the parties' existing rights without a prior adjudication that such
153. See Thompson v. Mazo, 421 F.2d 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1970); note 155 infra and accompanying text.
154. E.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395
U.S. 337 (1969).
155. Bell v. Tsintolas Realty Co., 430 F.2d 474 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (permitting order to tenant
to prepay rent into court escrow fund only on motion of landlord and after notice and opportunity
for oral argument). See also Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ii. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972)
(eviction appeal bonds invalidated on both state and federal constitutional grounds; "use and
occupancy" bonds impliedly authorized).
156. See Cooks v. Fowler, 437 F.2d 669, modified, 455 F.2d 1281 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Blanks
v. Fowler, 437 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
157. See Note, The Indigent'sRight to Counsel in Civil Cases,76 YALE L.J. 545, 555 (1967).
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a shift is merited. Given this inherent distinction, and the existence of
what could be found to be a reasonable alternative for the indigent
plaintiff in an action for money damages, it is conceivable that the
Boddie due process argument would not affect these plaintiff's security
requirements. Although it is possible that both the Douglas and Brennan
equal protection tests might find that strict scrutiny is required in this
situation, it is nevertheless plausible that the state might demonstrate
an interest in the protection of its citizens' existing possessory rights that
is sufficiently compelling, when coupled with the indigent plaintiff's
alternative protection of suing for damages, to sustain the security requirements.
Appeal bonds are superficially identical to plaintiffs' security
bonds, in that they represent security required of a party attacking the
status quo; indeed appeal bonds are subject to the special justification
that the status being attacked is that of a judicially determined legal
"' This reasoning appears to underlie the short judicial shrift given
right. 58
indigent challenges to appeal bond requirements.'59 Appeal bond requirements, however, present three considerations that do not arise in
the area of plaintiff's security bonds. First, in the special case of an
unsuccessful replevin or eviction defendant who wishes to remain in
possession pending an appeal, there is no readily apparent rationale for
treating the appeal bond any differently than the original security bond,
except, perhaps, for any re-evaluation necessary to reflect the judicial
support for plaintiff's claim. Secondly, the appeal bond frequently provides the appellee with two elements of protection-indemnification for
his costs in defending an unsuccessful appeal and security for the
amount of his judgment at the trial level. The cost element is subject to
the same criticisms that may be aimed at the cost component of the
second value of a double value defendant's security bond,' and the
judgment-security element is susceptible to attack as an unreasonable
bar to appellate access since it requires the indigent who seeks to pursue
a presumably meritorious appeal to guarantee his opponent greater
protection than the opponent would have by reason of his unappealed
and potentially unenforceable judgment. Thirdly, and most importantly,
the appeal bond is open to direct attack under Boddie. The indigent
appellant, unlike the indigent plaintiff, is already enmeshed in the judicial process and is subject to a binding adverse determination of his
rights when faced with this security requirement. His legal status is thus
158. See Damaskos v. Board of Appeal, 267 N.E.2d 897, 900 (Mass. 1971).
159. See, e.g., State ex rel. Caulk v. Nichols, 281 A.2d 24 (Del. 1971), appeal dismissed,
408 U.S. 901 (1972).
160. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
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analogous to that of the indigent criminal defendant unable, solely because he is too poor to take advantage of payment-conditioned opportunities established by the state, to obtain appellate review which is as
adequate as that available to a wealthier man. The argument that the
indigent civil appellant ought not to be heard to complain because he
has already been granted a trial on the merits is subject to the caustic
observation of one judge that systematic denial of appeals "could make
. . .trials less satisfactory than a determination of guilt by a litmus
paper test."1"1
4. Expenses.-The distinctions between due process and equal
protection approaches should prove useful in considering the state's
potential constitutional duty to assign counsel"' and assume other expenses of civil litigation. Of the three theories advanced in Boddie,
Justice Douglas's provides perhaps the weakest support for a duty to
assume expenses. Because there has been no state action to effect a
poverty classification, it would be extremely difficult to argue that the
state has indulged in an invidious discrimination merely by allowing
civil litigants to be represented by counsel or to invoke the aid of the
state in discovery procedures. Justice Brennan's equal protection argument'6 3 might prove to be of greater assistance. If representation by
counsel could be proved an essential element of court access, not merely
from a practical viewpoint, but rather from an understanding that the
judicial process contains an inherent and overwhelming structural bias
against the unrepresented litigant, the Court might well find an affirmative state duty to remove this unequal, state-created bar to effective
access. Once this major hurdle is cleared, it would be relatively easy for
the Court to expand the state's affirmative equal protection duty to
make all "essential" elements of the judicial mechanism effectively
available to all.
In considering the application of due process methodology to the
problem of expenses, little reliance should be placed on the criminal
rights cases because of their direct governance by the express commands
of the Bill of Rights. This does not, however, imply that the due process
approach, in the hands of a purposive Court, could not reach expenses
161. Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 58 Misc. 2d 1045, 1054 n.3, 296 N.Y.S.2d 74, 85 n.3 (Sup. Ct. 1968)
(Sobel, J.).
162. See Note, The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 COLtJM. L. REv. 1322 (1966);
Note, supra note 157.
163. Justice Brennan discussed only fee barriers, and did not suggest that purely de facto
wealth discrimination not resulting from a pricing mechanism of the state would raise the same
issues he found in Boddie. Nevertheless, his rationale did not necessarily require such a limited
position. See also Michelman, supra note 53.
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by characterizing them as necessary to a meaningful opportunity to be

heard.'64 Nevertheless, the development of a sweeping state duty to

assume the expenses of indigent litigation is, at best, unlikely. There is,
however, a possibility that the state may be constitutionally required in

certain circumstances to provide the indigent with counsel. When the
indigent, either as defendant or involuntary plaintiff, is forced into civil

court to protect an interest that involves the necessities of continued
existence, it is quite conceivable that the Court would find that the
balance of competing interests requires the state to provide counsel.1 5
One lower state court seems to have adopted this approach in holding

that the state must provide counsel to an indigent defendant in an eviction proceeding; ' the Supreme Court has declined the opportunity to
consider the issue. 67 It should be noted that a different constitutional
issue is presented when a statute that authorizes the state to assume an
indigent's expenses does not cover a specific litigant because of restric-

tions on applicability. Although the due process issue seems very similar, this disparate state treatment of similarly situated indigents could
provide a sufficiently active state classification to call for strict judicial
scrutiny, and, in the absence of a compelling state interest, ultimately
result in invalidation of the restrictions as violative of equal protection. 118
C.

Conclusion

In the wake of Mr. Justice Black's stirring vision of a judicial
system wholly devoid of financial barriers to access, 9 it is appropriate
to consider the probability of achieving this goal as a result of the
Court's decision in Boddie. Although this assessment must be unusually
speculative because of recent changes in the Court's personnel, there are
164. Cf. Lester v. Lester, 69 Misc. 2d 528, 330 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (dictum
indicating government payment for pretrial depositions would be required if necessary for indigent
party's effective access and if inexpensive substitute unavailable).
165. See In re B., 30 N.Y.2d 352, 285 N.E.2d 288, 334 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1972) (requiring
assigned counsel in child neglect proceedings).
166. Hotel Martha Washington Management Co. v. Swinick, 66 Misc. 2d 833, 322 N.Y.S.2d
139 (App. T. 1971).
167. Kaufman v. Carter, 402 U.S. 964 (1971), denying cert. to 8 Cal. App. 3d 783, 87 Cal.
Rptr. 678 (1970). But see 402 U.S. at 960 (indicating that Kaufman should be viewed as a quasicriminal case).
168. Following this reasoning to an extreme, City of New York v. Wyman, 66 Misc. 2d 402,
321 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct.), affdon other grounds, 37 App. Div. 2d 700,322 N.Y.S.2d 957 (1971)
(per curiam), rev'd mere., 30 N.Y.2d 537, 281 N.E.2d 180, 330 N.Y.S.2d 385 (1972), concluded
that the State of New York may not limit its assumption of the expense of indigents' abortions to
situations in which abortion is medically indicated.
169. See text accompanying note 110 supra.
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some fairly clear indications of the direction in which the Court is
moving. Perhaps the most obvious trend is the Court's growing disenchantment with "new" equal protection as a remedial adjudicatory
tool. 170 Although a significant withdrawal from its past ground-breaking
decisions does not seem probable, the Court seems likely to find only
limited new application for those decisions. Thus, even if Justice Brennan's characterization of access to court as a fundamental right were
to be adopted, it is improbable that the Court would require more under
the equal protection aegis than invalidation of required fee payments to
court officials. Boddie, Griffin, and Harper demand no more. 7' The
prospects for a continued expansive utilization of the due process clause
are more difficult to estimate, largely because the death of Mr. Justice
Harlan has removed that clause's staunchest supporter from the Bench.
Although the Court's recent extensions of the applicability of procedural due process criteria7 2 generally have commanded more than a
bare majority, and although these decisions bear little resemblance to
Justice Harlan's anti-incorporation "concept of ordered liberty" opinions, it is nevertheless problematic whether the Court is prepared to
implement fully the possibilities of the new due process mechanic as
articulated by Mr. Justice Harlan's majority opinion in Boddie.
Assuming, however, that the Court is unwilling to ignore Boddie's fertile
potential, a proper expansion of that rationale will require certain preparatory steps. The most important of these will be for the Court to
recognize and define the mechanic employed in the majority opinion as
a more easily administrable "test," with careful emphasis on placing the
"fundamental" quality of the Boddie plaintiffs' asserted right in its
proper perspective. Moreover, the Court must apply Boddie to establish
general procedural guidelines and to avoid the image of limited caseby-case adjudication. That there is a very real practical necessity for the
Court to ensure a precise development of the Boddie rationale can be
seen by observing the present general failure to understand the require73
ments of that approach at the state and lower federal court levels. If
the Court does choose to develop the possibilities opened by the Boddie
decision, and if this approach is adopted, as it surely would be, by other
courts, this due process methodology should provide a principled, incre170. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
171. It should be noted, however, that "new" equal protection is still commonly applied in
lower federal and state courts; several more years will pass before these judicial bodies fall in line
with the Court's recent reluctance.
172. E.g., Bell v. Biirson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433
(1971).
173. See note 77 supra.
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mental expansion of the access rights of the indigent civil litigant.
A rather enigmatic indication of the possibilities for future invalidation of the financial barriers faced by the indigent civil litigant was
presented by the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in five access
cases just two months after the Boddie decision was announced. Involved in those cases were challenges to the bankruptcy referee's fee, 7 1
appellate filing fees 75 and security bonds, 76 double-rent eviction
bonds,' and a state refusal to provide counsel at a child dependency
hearing.' The significance of the Court's refusal to hear these challenges is not readily apparent; at least two of the cases'79 presented
factual situations that would have seriously obstructed consideration of
the constitutional issue, and only the bankruptcy case was represented
by a thorough lower court opinion disposing of the constitutional challenge. On the same day, moreover, the Court vacated two decisions that
denied a right of access' and set another,1 8' involving a challenge to the
bond requirements and procedural limitations of a summary
dispossession statute, for argument. If any conclusion may be drawn
from this ambiguous action, it can only be that the Court feels no
compulsion to effect a hasty and sweeping revision in court cost structures.
There is a broad spectrum of possible justifications for the Court's
apparent decision to go slowly in fashioning a full constitutional right
of access to the civil courts. One uncharitably disposed toward this
hesitance might choose to characterize the Court as hopeful of avoiding
the issue and leaving it instead to the mercies of the lower and state
courts, or perhaps as desirous of undercutting Boddie without forthrightly overruling it. Justice Black was probably nearer the mark with
his suggestion in dissent that the Court hoped to soften the impact on
state judicial systems by a gradual extension of the right of access,
perhaps thereby allowing state legislatures to forestall litigation through
the enactment of truly effective in forma pauperis statutes. 8 2 There may
be, however, an even more important reason for a slow implementation
of the Boddie rationale. Boddie represents an attempt to preserve the
174. In re Garland, 402 U.S. 966 (1971).
175. Bourbeau v. Lancaster, 402 U.S. 964 (1971).
176. Beverly v. Scotland Urban Enterprises, Inc., 402 U.S. 936 (1971).
177. Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954 (1971).
178. Kaufman v. Carter, 402 U.S. 964 (1971).
179. Meltzer involved both mootness problems and intervening state legislative action; access was not the basic issue in Kaufman. See note 167 supra.
180. Frederick v. Schwartz, 402 U.S. 937 (1971); Sloatman v. Gibbons, 402 U.S. 939 (1971).
181. Lindsey v. Normet, 402 U.S. 941 (1971).
182. Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954, 956 (1971).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

integrity of the American judicial system by making it more accessible
to all. There is, however, an equally important threat to the integrity of

the judicial process-"the law's delay." Although the majority was able
in the narrow context of divorce litigation to reject out of hand the
asserted state interest in conserving judicial resources, it might well have
been unable to ignore as easily the practical threat of unlimited state

subsidization and administration of indigent litigation had it announced
the broad principles urged in concurrence. 13 The state's financial interest 184 seems abstractly to lack countervailing force when compared with
an individual's right of access to the one societal organism that is truly
"preservative of all rights,"' 85 but if unlimited access to the civil courts
would in fact result in lack of effective access for all, it is difficult to
perceive any net gain in removing the financial barriers to civil litigation. Thus the Court's apparent decision to implement Boddie gradually
may have the salutary effect of opening the courthouse doors only as

much as may practically be possible and, at the same time, of forcefully
encouraging legislative investigation and implementation of the structural reforms necessary to make "equal justice for all" a realistic possibility.*
WAYNE HOLBROOK SCOTT
183.
184.

See id.
Saari, Open Doors to Justice-An Overview of FinancingJustice in America, 50
JUDICATURE 296 (1967), however, indicates that state governments in 1962 spent less than 0.6% of
total expenditures on the civil and criminal courts combined.
185. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
* After the preparation of this Note, the United States Supreme Court reversed, in a 5-4
decision, the district court decision in In re Kras, 331 F. Supp. 1207 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (invalidating
referee's fee in voluntary bankruptcy) (discussed in notes 91 and 128 supra), United States v. Kras,
41 U.S.L.W. 4117 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1973). The significance of this decision for future constitutional
right of access claims is unclear; although the majority opinion, authored by Mr. Justice Blackmun,
offered several grounds for its rejection of respondent's due process and equal protection arguments, it made no attempt to redefine the parameters of Boddie or to establish guidelines for
adjudicating future access challenges. Forceful dissenting opinions criticizing the majority's purported distinction of Boddie were filed by Justices Stewart and Marshall. Justices Douglas and
Brennan also dissented on equal protection grounds.

